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[499] 
Are U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional? 
JOHN D. LESHY* 
Arguments are sometimes mademost recently in a paper commissioned by the 
State of Utah, and by a lawyer for a defendant facing charges for the armed 
takeover of a National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon in 2016that U.S. public lands are 
unconstitutional. This article disputes that position. It digs deeply into the history of 
the public lands, going back to the very founding of the nation. It seeks to show that 
the arguments for unconstitutionality reflect an incomplete, defective understanding 
of U.S. legal and political history; an extremely selective, skewed reading of 
numerous Supreme Court decisions and federal statutes; a misleading assertion that 
states have very limited governing authority over activities taking place on U.S. 
public lands; and even a misuse of the dictionary. At bottom, the arguments rest on 
the premise that the U.S. Supreme Court should use the U.S. Constitution to 
determine how much if any land the U.S. may own in any state. For the Court to 
assume that responsibility would be a breathtaking departure from more than 225 
years of practice during which Congress has made that determination through the 
political process, and from a century and a half of Supreme Court precedent 
deferring to Congress. It would also be contrary to the Court’s often 
expressed reluctance to revisit settled public land law, upon which so many property 
transactions depend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I 
appreciate the helpful suggestions of Gregory Ablavsky, Eric Biber, Michael C. Blumm, Daniel Feller, 
John Freemuth, Bill Hedden, John F. Nagel, Zachary Price, and John Ruple on earlier drafts, as well 
as the excellent assistance of the editorial team of the Hastings Law Journal. Any errors are the 
author’s alone.  
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INTRODUCTION 
From time to time, arguments have been advanced that the answer 
to the question posed in the title to this article is “yes.” Articles taking 
that position date back to the 1940s,1 in connection with the 
unsuccessful efforts by a number of coastal states to establish their 
ownership of submerged lands on the Outer Continental Shelf through 
litigation.2 More recently, several articles embrace the idea that there 
are significant constitutional limits on the U.S. government’s power to 
own public lands.3 
This article disputes that position. It focuses in part on the legal 
analysis prepared by the Legal Consulting Services Team for the Utah 
Commission for the Stewardship of Public Lands established by the 
Utah State Legislature in 2015 (“Utah Paper”).4 That paper concludes 
that “legitimate legal theories exist to pursue litigation in an effort to 
gain ownership or control of the public lands” in Utah.5 In a potent 
reminder that constitutional arguments can have tangible 
consequences, the Utah Paper has been cited by, among others, the 
lawyer for Ammon Bundy, who, claiming that U.S. ownership of public 
lands was unconstitutional, spearheaded the armed takeover of the 
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon in early 2016.6 
 
 1. See, e.g., Robert E. Hardwicke, Carl Illig, & C. Perry Patterson, The Constitution and the 
Continental Shelf, 26 TEX. L. REV. 398 (1948); C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal 
Government to the Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1949). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 364–366, 431–442. 
 3. See, e.g., Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues 
Surrounding Federal Ownership of Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693 (1981); Spencer Driscoll, Utah’s 
Enabling Act and Congress’s Enclave Clause Authority: Federalism Implications of a Renewed 
State Sovereignty Movement, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 999 (2012); Donald J. Kochan, Public Lands and 
the Federal Government’s CompactBased “Duty to Dispose”: A Case Study of Utah’s H.B. 
148The Transfer of Public Lands Act, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1133 (2013); Carolyn M. Landever, 
Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federalism and State Jurisdiction on Public 
Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557 (1995); Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the 
Constitution’s Property Clause: The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327 (2005); see 
also Louis Touton, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 817 (1980). David Engdahl published a detailed paper arguing that states had more 
constitutional authority over public lands within their borders than they realized or the courts had 
acknowledged, but he did not dispute the constitutionality of U.S. ownership of public lands inside 
states. David E. Engdahl, Federalism and Energy: State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 
18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 366 (1976) (“[I]t is entirely in the discretion of Congress whether the United 
States will retain its property, or dispose of it by lease, sell it, or give it away.”).  
 4. JOHN W. HOWARD ET AL., LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL CONSULTING SERVICES TEAM 
PREPARED FOR THE UTAH COMMISSION FOR THE STEWARDSHIP OF PUBLIC LANDS (Dec. 9, 2015) 
http://le.utah.gov/interim/2015/pdf/00005590.pdf. The current authorization for the Commission 
is available at UTAH CODE 63C-4b-103 (2016).  
 5. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 1. 
 6. Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 4, 8, 13, United States v. Ammon Bundy, No. 3:16-CR-00051 
(D. Or. May 9, 2016).  
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The Utah Paper is the most recent comprehensive collection of 
arguments for why the U.S. Supreme Court should craft and enforce 
constitutional limits on U.S. ownership of public lands within states. It 
was prepared after the Utah Governor signed the “Transfer of Public 
Lands Act” into law in 2012, which set a December 31, 2014 deadline for 
the United States to turn over its public lands to the State.7 Not long 
after that, the Utah Legislature appropriated several hundred thousand 
dollars to fund preparation of the Utah Paper.8 This paper 
recommended that the Legislature appropriate up to fourteen million 
dollars to litigate the matter.9 As Utah seems to be serious about 
litigating the matter, the Utah Paper merits some examination. 
Because arguments for constitutional limits on U.S. landholdings 
draw heavily on history, this article digs rather deeply into the history of 
the public lands in Congress and the courts. In particular, it seeks to 
shed new light on a puzzling Supreme Court decision, Pollard  
v. Hagan, which is a mainstay of the argument.10 It also briefly 
addresses arguments based on the Enclave Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.11 This article draws on, but is somewhat different from, 
other articles that have defended the constitutionality of U.S. 
landownership.12 
 
 7. See H.B. 48, 2012 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2012); see also Transfer of Public Lands Act and Study, 
UTAH’S PUB. LAND POL’Y COORDINATING OFF., http://publiclands.utah.gov/current-projects/ 
transfer-of-public-lands-act (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 8. Brian Maffly, Utah Legislature Is Investigating Questioned Billings from Public-Land-
Transfer Lawyers, Consultants, SALT LAKE TRIB., (July 8, 2016, 8:45 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/ 
article.php?id=4095491&itype=CMSID. 
 9. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 145; see also Brian Maffly, Republicans OK $14M Land-
Transfer Lawsuit, Say Utah Must Regain Sovereignty, SALT LAKE TRIB., (Dec. 9, 2015, 10:42 PM), 
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3287281&itype=CMSID. 
 10. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845). See text accompanying notes 214–276 infra.  
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. See, e.g., Driscoll, supra note 3; Natelson supra note 3. 
 12. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause 
and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Robert Barrett, History on 
an Equal Footing: Ownership of the Western Federal Lands, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 761 (1997); 
Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its Discontents: Lessons from the 
Malheur Occupation, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781 (2016); Richard D. Clayton, The Sagebrush Rebellion: 
Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505 (1980); George Cameron Coggins, 
Parthenia Blessing Evans, & Margaret Lindberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland 
Management I: The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 ENVTL. L. 535, 567–78 (1982); 
Paul Conable, Equal Footing, County Supremacy, and the Western Public Lands, 26 ENVTL. L. 1263 
(1996); Eugene R. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion under the Property Clause, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 
381 (1981); Eugene Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N. C. L. REV. 617 
(1985); Dale Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 495 
(1986); Robert B. Keiter & John C. Ruple, A Legal Analysis of the Transfer of Public Lands 
Movement, WALLACE STEGNER CTR. FOR LAND, RES. & THE ENV. (2014); Nick Lawton, Utah’s Transfer 
of Public Lands Act: Demanding a Gift of Federal Lands, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2014); A. 
Constandina Titus, The Nevada “Sagebrush Rebellion” Act: A Question of Constitutionality, 23 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 263 (1981). I previously addressed some of these issues in John D. Leshy, Unraveling the 
Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 317 (1980). I have also 
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As used in this article and for the most part in the Utah Paper, 
“public lands” refers to any lands to which the United States holds title. 
This clarification is necessary because there is no universally accepted 
meaning of the term “public lands” in U.S. law. For example, in the 
1964 law establishing the Public Land Law Review Commission 
(“PLLRC”), Congress defined it to include lands managed by the Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”), the U.S. Forest Service, the National 
Park Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.13 Five years later, in 
the Wild, Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, Congress defined it to 
include only lands administered by the BLM and U.S. Forest Service.14 
Five years after that, in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(“FLPMA”), which implemented many of the recommendations of the 
PLLRC, Congress defined it to refer only to those federally-owned lands 
administered by the BLM.15 
This article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes how the 
nation’s founders dealt with the public lands, starting with the cessions 
to the nation of claims to western lands by seven of the original states 
through the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, including its 
Property and Enclave Clauses and its Clause governing the admission of 
new states. 
Part II covers public land policy up to the Civil War. It examines 
congressional debates in the late 1820s, when an argument very similar 
to the argument of the Utah Paper was put forth but gained no traction 
in the Congress. This Part also covers the principal Supreme Court 
decisions of this era addressing the scope of national power over public 
lands, focusing mostly on Pollard v. Hagan and Dred Scott  
v. Sandford. 
Part III summarizes how the Congress and the Supreme Court have 
addressed national power over public lands since the Civil War, 
including how the Court has narrowed Pollard v. Hagan and ignored its 
broad dicta. 
Part IV examines the Utah Paper’s “Compact Theory.” It explores 
the circumstances surrounding Utah’s admission to the Union and 
whether those circumstances give Utah a colorable claim to own public 
lands. 
Part V focuses more broadly on the “equal footing” and “equal 
sovereignty” arguments in the Utah Paper. 
Part VI addresses a number of remaining problems with the 
position advocated in the Utah Paper. These include its 
 
benefited from the generosity of Gregory Ablavsky, who allowed me to review a draft of his article. 
See Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 10, 78 Stat. 982, 985 (1964). 
 14. 16 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (1971).  
 15. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1976). 
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mischaracterization of current federal public land policy regarding 
divestiture, the vagueness of its claims to public lands and the judicial 
remedy it seeks, the fact that Utah has a political remedy for its alleged 
grievances, and the lack of success of past assertions of claims that 
western states have claims to public lands. 
I.  HOW THE NATION’S FOUNDERS DEALT WITH THE PUBLIC LANDS 
A. THE ORIGINS OF THE NATION’S PUBLIC LANDS16 
Understanding the constitutional basis of the nation’s public lands 
requires going back to the founding of the nation. Even before the 
Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, representatives of the 
thirteen original states had started work crafting Articles of 
Confederation that they intended to be the governing charter of the new 
national government. The Articles would not, by their own terms, take 
effect until they were ratified by all thirteen states. 
A dispute prevented the Articles from being formally ratified for 
several years. Because their colonial charters had very imprecise 
boundaries, seven of the original states had claims to western lands 
beyond the Appalachian Mountains. Six did not.17 The latter, led by 
Maryland, balked at ratifying the Articles until the claims to western 
lands were relinquished. The stalemate left the nation without a 
formally constituted government at the very time it was fighting to gain 
its independence. 
Eventually, the nation’s founders came to accept Maryland’s 
argument that those western lands should “be considered as common 
property” of the nation, because they were being “wrested from the 
common enemy by blood and treasure of the thirteen states.”18 The 
seven states with claims to western lands agreed to cede them to the 
national government, and upon that assurance, the Articles of 
Confederation were ratified. With the cession of that “common 
property” west of the Appalachian crest, the national government took 
 
 16. This story is told in numerous places, including JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: 
ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1783–1789 5–6, 12–16, 32–34 (2015); PAUL W. 
GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 49–57 (1968); Appel, supra note 12.  
 17. A useful map showing the claims to the western lands can be found at State Cessions, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_cessions (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 18. GATES, supra note 16, at 50 (quoting Declaration of Maryland Assembly, Jan. 6, 1779); see 
also MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 202–04 (1940); 14 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONG. 621 (May 1779); 17 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 806–08 (Sept. 1780). In considering the 
relationship of the national government to the states in this founding era, it is important to note that, 
in Professor Richard Morris’s words, the “federal Union not only preceded the States in time, but 
initiated their formation,” because states were a “creation of the Continental Congress, which . . . 
brought them into being.” Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A Historical 
Refutation of State Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1056, 1057, 1089 (1974); see also 
Garry Wills, A Necessary Evil (1999) 60–61.  
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ownership of some 230 million acres of land, an area nearly equal to 
that of the thirteen original states. These were the beginning of the 
nation’s public lands. 
This accomplishment can be summarized in four documents. The 
first is the October 10, 1780 Resolution of Second Continental Congress 
that urged the states with western land claims to cede them to the 
United States. It called for these lands to be “disposed of for the 
common benefit of all the United States,” and further specified that the 
land grant and settlement process shall proceed “at such times and 
under such regulations as shall hereafter be agreed on by the United 
States in Congress assembled.”19 
The second, Virginia’s 1784 cession to the United States of the 
western lands it claimed, called for these ceded lands to be “considered 
as a common fund for the use and benefit of the United States” and that 
the lands “shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, 
and for no other use or purpose whatsoever.”20 
The third is the famous Northwest Ordinance adopted by the 
Congress of the Confederation in 1787. Among other things, it 
established a framework for admitting new states out of the Northwest 
Territory, and specified that those new States “shall never interfere with 
the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress 
assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for 
securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.”21 
The last and most important is the United States Constitution, 
which replaced the Articles of Confederation in 1788. It gives Congress 
nearly unfettered discretion regarding whether, when, and on what 
terms new states may be admitted to the Union.22 Further, its so-called 
Property Clause gives Congress “power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”23 
The Property Clause’s main purpose was to provide an explicit 
foundation for the national government’s authority over public lands.24 
Before the Constitution was adopted, the Congress of the Confederation 
had established the nation’s first public land policies in three 
ordinances enacted in 1784, 1785 and 1787 (the latter known as the 
Northwest Ordinance). Although these Ordinances reflected the 
consensus of opinion at the time, they had been adopted, as James 
Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers, “without the least color of 
 
 19. See 18 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 915 (Oct. 10, 1780); see also GATES, supra note 16, at 51.  
 20. GATES, supra note 16, at 52. For a detailed discussion of the terms of the seven states’ 
cessions of their western land claims, see Goble, supra note 12, at 519–20, n.106–07. 
 21. 32 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 334 (1778).  
 22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 23. Id. at cl. 2. 
 24. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO.7 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 3, 43 (James Madison).  
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constitutional authority,”25 because the Articles of Confederation had 
not explicitly given the Congress of the Confederation that power. 
The Property Clause did not provoke significant discussion at the 
Constitutional Convention. Armed with its authority, the new U.S. 
Congress re-enacted the Northwest Ordinance in its entirety at its first 
session.26 
B. “DISPOSE” DOES NOT MEAN EXCLUSIVELY “DIVEST” 
Some who challenge U.S. ownership of public lands assume that 
“dispose of” and similar words that appear in these founding documents 
meant only divestiture or transfer of ownership or title. This 
assumption is made explicit in a flat assertion in the Utah Paper: “The 
term ‘disposed of’ meant ‘sold,’ ‘granted’ or ‘transferred’ in the 18th 
Century. Webster’s Dictionary, 1828.”27 
In fact, Webster’s 1828 Dictionary sets out eight possible 
definitions of “to dispose of.” Of these, only the three that are quoted in 
the Utah Paper connote divestiture. The other five, omitted from the 
Utah Paper, are “to direct the course of a thing,” “to place in any 
condition,” “to direct what to do or what course to pursue,” “to use or 
employ,” and “to put away.”28 
Of course, the nation’s founders could not rely on Webster’s, which 
was not published until four decades later. Samuel Johnson’s famous 
Dictionary of the English Language, which was available to the founders 
(and upon which Webster drew), similarly lists several broad meanings 
of “dispose,” including “to regulate,” “to place in any condition,” and “to 
apply to any purpose.”29 
There is no credible evidenceand the authors of the Utah Paper 
offer none, other than their cherry-picking of Webster’s 1828 
Dictionarythat our nation’s founders intended by the use of “dispose 
of” to require the national government to divest itself of title to all of the 
lands it came to own, to newly-admitted states, or to anyone else. 
Over the last century or so, Congress has from time to time used 
words like “dispose of” or “disposal” in various public land statutes. 
Even if Congress’s usage during this time had been consistent, it would 
not have shed much, if any, light on what the nation’s founders meant 
 
 25. THE FEDERALIST NO.38 (James Madison).  
 26. Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).  
 27. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 104 n.228. 
 28. Dispose, WEBSTERSDICTONARY1828.COM, http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/ 
dispose (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 29. To Dispose of, JOHNSONSDICTIONARYONLINE.COM, http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/ 
?page_id=7070&i=617 (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). Chambers’ Etymological Dictionary of the 
English Language traces the origin of “dispose” as borrowed from the Old French from Latin 
disponere, which meant to “put in order,” or “arrange.” CHAMBERS’ ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 133 (Andrew Findlater & Rev. Thomas Davidson eds., 1904).  
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by those words in the late 18th century.30 But Congress has used these 
words to mean different things. In the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 
(“TGA”), for example, Congress legislated a new management system 
for what is now BLM-managed public land “pending its final disposal,” 
but without specifying whether divestiture of title was the only possible 
“final disposal” of these lands.31 In the first section of FLPMA, enacted 
in 1976, Congress used the words “to dispose of” to refer to divestiture 
of title, pronouncing U.S. policy as favoring retention of public lands “in 
Federal ownership, unless” the U.S. determined that “disposal of a 
particular parcel will serve the national interest.”32 But in the same era, 
Congress continued to use the term “dispose of” as applied to public 
lands to mean something other than transfer of title out of U.S. 
ownership. For example, statutes enacted in 1956 and 1962 used 
“dispose of” to refer to shifting responsibility for managing public lands 
from one federal agency to another federal agency or to a state or local 
governmental agency, by “lease, transfer, exchange, or conveyance.”33 
In other contexts, Congress continued to use the words “dispose of” to 
mean something other than divestiture; for example, calling for 
“disposal of” nuclear waste does not mean transferring title to it, but 
rather safeguarding or putting it in a contained condition.34 
C. THE CONSTITUTION, “EQUAL FOOTING,” PUBLIC LAND OWNERSHIP, 
AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
The Utah Paper and others, including the American Legislative 
Exchange Council (“ALEC”), which advocates politically conservative 
positions to state legislatures, make two interrelated arguments about 
the Constitution, the public lands, and the admission of new states. The 
first is that the Constitution’s framers required that new states be 
admitted on an “equal footing” with existing states. The second is that 
this idea of “equal footing” extended to holdings of public lands in these 
states. 
ALEC’s model “Resolution on Transfer of Public Lands,” for 
example, takes the position that framers of the Constitution approved of 
national ownership of public lands only for the purpose of launching 
 
 30. On the use of dictionaries in constitutional interpretation, see Gompers v. United States,  
233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 
468 n.4 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon 
Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 
227 (1999).  
 31. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1934). 
 32. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1976).  
 33. See Pub. L. No. 87–590, § 4, 76 Stat. 389, 391 (1962); see also Pub. L. No. 84–485, § 8, 70 
Stat. 105, 110 (1956).  
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 10101(9) (1983) (defining nuclear waste “disposal” to mean its “emplacement in 
a repository” with “no foreseeable intent of recovery.”).  
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“new states with the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence as the original states.”35 That being the case, the ALEC 
resolution continues, the Constitution did not intend to “authorize the 
federal government to indefinitely exercise control over western public 
lands beyond the duty to manage the lands pending the[ir] 
disposal . . . to create new states.”36 
It is useful to keep separate these interrelated argumentsthat the 
Constitution requires new states to be admitted on an “equal footing” 
with existing states, and that this principle extends to public 
landholdings. Even if a principle of “equal footing” among states is 
deemed to have a constitutional dimension, it is far from clear that the 
idea would or should extend to U.S. ownership of public lands inside 
states.37  
The Utah Paper also makes a significant further assumption; 
namely, that the constitutional framers contemplated that the U.S. 
Supreme Court would play a significant role in policing Congress’s 
power over public lands in connection with the admission of new states. 
The facts support none of these arguments and assumptions. It is 
true that, years before the Constitution was crafted, the founding 
generation had spoken positively about new states having some political 
equality with existing states. Thus, the Second Continental Congress 
urged in its 1780 Resolution that the seven states with western land 
claims cede them to the nation so that these lands could be “settled and 
formed into” new states with “the same rights of sovereignty, freedom 
and independence, as the other states.”38 
The Northwest Ordinance, enacted in 1787 by the Congress of the 
Confederation just as the Constitution was being crafted in 
Philadelphia, had boiled the words “same rights of sovereignty, freedom 
and independence” down to the simple phrase of “equal footing.”39 
Specifically, it provided for the “establishment of States, and permanent 
government therein, and for their admission to a share in the federal 
councils on an equal footing with the original States, at as early periods 
as may be consistent with the general interest.”40 The reference to 
“share in federal councils” signals the understanding of the Ordinance’s 
framers that “equal footing” referred to equal political status, and did 
not apply to public lands or U.S. land policy. 
In its very next section, this implication is made even clearer. It 
proposed a compact between the original States and “the people and 
 
 35. See Resolution on Transfer of Public Lands, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Sept. 29, 2013), 
https://www.alec.org/model-policy/resolution-transfer-public-lands/. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See infra text accompanying notes 47–62, 423–426. 
 38. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 39. Northwest Ordinance, 1st Cong., Sess. I, ch. 8, § 13 (July 13, 1787).  
 40. Id. 
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States” that shall be formed in said territory.41 That proposed compact 
had six articles. Article 4 provided, among other things, that the 
“legislatures of those . . . new States, shall never interfere with the 
primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled, 
nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for securing the 
title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.”42 Article 5 provided more 
detail on the statehood process, calling on Congress to admit western 
territories on specified conditions “on an equal footing with the original 
States in all respects whatever,” so long as the “constitution and 
government” of such new states “shall be . . . in conformity to the 
principles contained in these articles.”43 
After carefully examining the matter, the leading historian of the 
Northwest Ordinance concluded that its understanding of “equality” in 
its reference to “equal footing” was “narrowly defined.”44 It referred to 
political status, and not to other subjects like economic or resource 
equality, or equality as respects U.S. landholdings.45 
The predecessor to the U.S. Constitution, the Articles of 
Confederation, did not speak of admitting new states on an equal 
footing with existing states. Its Article XI gave Canada automatic 
admission should it choose to apply, which would entitle it “to all the 
advantages of this Union,” but went on simply to provide that “no other 
colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be 
agreed to by nine States.”46 
The U.S. Constitution took the same approach as the Articles. It 
includes no general language calling for equality among the states. 
Article IV, section 4 simply provides that “[n]ew States may be admitted 
by the Congress into this Union,”47 and goes on to prohibit Congress 
from creating a new state by carving it from territory within the 
jurisdiction of an existing state, or by combining states or parts of 
states, “without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States 
concerned.”48 
Other parts of the Constitution do provide specific guarantees of 
equality between existing and new states. For example, each State is to 
have two Senators,49 a mandate underscored by a separate provision 
 
 41. Id. at § 14.  
 42. Id. at § 14, art. 4.  
 43. Id. at art. 5. 
 44. PETER ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 68 (1987). 
 45. See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and 
Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 32–34 (1997); John Hanna, Equal Footing in the 
Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519, 523 (1951).  
 46. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XI. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. art. I, § 3. 
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that “no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate.”50 The Constitution also guarantees each State 
representation in the House of Representatives51 and the Electoral 
College.52 It gives each State one vote for President in the event no 
candidate receives a majority of votes of the Electoral College.53 It 
provides that federal laws on bankruptcy and naturalization, and “all 
Duties, Imposts and Excises,” shall be uniform “throughout the United 
States.”54 And it directs the United States to “guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government.”55 
But the Constitution makes no general reference to states being on 
an “equal footing” with each other, with respect to public land 
ownership or, for that matter, anything else. 
The Utah Paper ignores much of this history, except for some 
cherry-picking. As it notes twice,56 the framers of the U.S. Constitution 
rejected a proposal by delegate Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts to give 
the original thirteen states greater representation in Congress than new 
states. The Utah Paper argues that this shows an intent on the part of 
the framers to constitutionalize a broad principle of “equal footing.” 
But the Utah Paper neglects to note that the framers deleted, from 
the end of the draft clause authorizing Congress to admit new states to 
the Union, the words “on the same terms with the original States.”57 As 
noted earlier, language similar to this had been included in the 1780 
resolution of the Second Continental Congress and in the Virginia 
cession of its western land claims in 1784.58 
Even this limited conception of equal footing failed to make it into 
the U.S. Constitution. Instead, the framers of the U.S. Constitution 
decided to delete the language that new states be admitted “on the same 
terms with the original states.”59 This was done on a motion by delegate 
Gouverneur Morris, one of the principal architects of the Constitution.60 
In approving Morris’s motion, the framers brushed aside the opposition 
of another of the Constitution’s principal architects, James Madison, 
who argued that “Western States neither would nor ought to submit to a 
Union which degraded them from an equal rank with the other 
States.”61 
 
 50. Id. art. V.  
 51. Id. art. I, § 2, cl.1. 
 52. Id. art. II, § 1, cl.2. 
 53. Id. amend. XII. 
 54. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 4.  
 55. Id. art. IV, § 4. 
 56. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 12, 40.  
 57. See 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787 325, 465 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).  
 58. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20; GATES, supra note 16, at 73–74. 
 59. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 109 (1913). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.; see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 
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The constitutional history thus plainly reflects the framers’ 
decision to leave the terms for admitting new states, including any 
guidance regarding public lands, entirely up to future Congresses, 
except for the provisions cited earlier providing specific guarantees of 
equality or uniform treatment to new states.62 In their view, the 
national political processnot some constitutional principlewould 
govern the disposition of public lands in relation to new states as they 
are admitted. 
Furthermore, although the Utah Paper recommends that Utah seek 
to enlist the Supreme Court in its campaign to gain ownership of public 
lands, it offers no evidenceand none existsthat the framers of the 
Constitution contemplated a role for the courts in determining how 
Congress would “dispose” of the public lands. 
America’s founding generation could well have anticipated that 
Congress would, over time, divest the United States of ownership of 
many of those lands it came to own from the seven states’ cession of 
their western land claims, and to admit new states to the Union as 
settlement expanded onto those lands. Having just fought a war to gain 
independence, the founders wanted to keep the new nation unified as 
the western lands were settled and the nation grew. Controlling the 
terms of settlement through public land policy and the admission of 
new states was key to maintaining that unity, and that required, in 
historian Peter Onuf’s words, a “strong national government.”63 
While divestiture of public lands was an important means for 
advancing settlement, and the admission of new states an important 
means to keep the nation unified, there is no credible evidence that the 
founders intended to put the national government under any legal 
obligation to divest itself of ownership of all the public lands, whether to 
new states or anyone else. Indeed, such an objective would have made 
no sense to the politically savvy founders. There is no question that 
they, and the states they hailed from, regarded these lands as being 
bought with their “blood and treasure,” and they expected these lands to 
be used for the “common benefit” of the entire nation.64 Thus, they were 
very unlikely to support relinquishing all control over them to new 
states. 
The founders’ shared understanding left ample room for Congress 
to decide to “dispose of” some public land by keeping it in national 
ownership in order to serve some national purposes. And that is exactly 
what happened. Over the next two centuries, the United States decided 
 
1801–1829 243–45, 294–95 (2001); GATES, supra note 16, at 73–74; Goble, supra note 12, at  
526–28. 
 62. See supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text. 
 63. ONUF, supra note 44, at xiii.  
 64. See supra text accompanying note 18–19. 
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to retain ownership of some lands for such uses as military bases, 
Indian reservations, mineral reservations, national parks, forest 
reserves, wildlife refuges, national monuments, historic sites, nuclear 
waste repositories, and so forth. This outcome was fully consistent with 
the founders’ general approach. They designed a system intended, as 
historian Joseph Ellis put it, “less to resolve arguments than to make 
argument itself the solution;” not to offer specific guidance on many 
issues but “instead to provide a political arena in which arguments 
about those contested issues could continue in a deliberative fashion,” 
and a “political platform wide enough to allow for considerable latitude 
within which future generations could make their own decisions.”65 
Congress admitted thirty-seven new states after the original 
thirteen, in individual pieces of legislation. In nearly all of these, 
Congress provided that the new state was admitted on an “equal 
footing” with existing states. “Equal footing” language was included in 
the Utah Enabling Act Congress adopted in 1894, which established the 
terms upon which Utah could seek admission to the Union,66 and in 
President Grover Cleveland’s proclamation admitting Utah to the Union 
two years later.67 But in nearly every case, including Utah’s, admission 
legislation also included language like that in section 4 of the Northwest 
Ordinance, prohibiting new states from ever interfering with the 
decisions of the United States regarding public lands.68 
D. AN ASIDE: THE ENCLAVE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The U.S. Constitution contains another measure, the so-called 
“Enclave Clause,” that bears on ownership of property by the national 
government. Its first half is fairly straightforward, giving the U.S. 
Congress total control over the seat of the national government and the 
District of Columbia. Its second half, however, is one of the more 
puzzling provisions in the entire Constitution. Adopted after only a few 
minutes of debate,69 its obscure and awkward language has never had 
any significant impact on public land policymaking. Presumably for this 
reason, the Utah Paper does not put much reliance on the Enclave 
Clause, citing it only once in 150 pages.70 
 
 65. ELLIS, supra note 16, at 172, 219.  
 66. 28 Stat. 107 (1894).  
 67. Admission of Utah as a State, 29 Stat. 876 (1896). 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43. Admission legislation for a few early-admitted 
states like Ohio provided the same thing less directly, by requiring that the new state’s constitution 
“not be repugnant to” the Northwest Ordinance, which contained this disclaimer. How the Supreme 
Court has considered the “equal footing” idea or its cousin, “equal sovereignty,” in the modern era is 
discussed in the text accompanying notes 413–491.  
 69. See Engdahl, supra note 3, at 288, n.10. 
 70. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 99. 
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The Enclave Clause is relied on, sometimes rather heavily, by 
others who maintain that U.S. permanent ownership of public lands is 
unconstitutional.71 These include allies of those who engineered the 
armed takeover of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon in 
early 2016.72 
The Enclave Clause reads, in pertinent part: 
“Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive Legislation in all 
Cases whatsoever over . . . the Seat of the Government of the United 
States [such as, the District of Columbia], and to exercise like 
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature 
of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, 
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”73 
The italicized text raises many questions; to wit: 
 Does the Clause have anything to do with ownership of lands, or 
does it deal only with Congress’s power to exercise “exclusive 
legislation,” presumably meaning the power to make laws respecting 
certain “Places”? 
 If the reference to “Places” includes lands, does it apply only to 
lands containing military or defense installations? Does it apply to lands 
used for purposes other than the “erection of” structures? 
If it does apply to lands, does it prevent the U.S. from acquiring 
land inside a state without the state’s consent, if the United States does 
not exercise “exclusive” legislative authority over such lands? 
Does it apply only to such “Places” found within the original 
thirteen states, which had few public lands within their borders? In 
those states, the United States had a greater need to purchase lands to 
carry out national objectives like defense. 
Does it apply to lands the United States already owns inside 
states admitted by Congress to the Union after the original thirteen? 
The United States owned substantial amounts of land within the 
borders of nearly all of those states at the time of their admission.74 
Does it have any application to the purchase by the United States 
of Indian lands found within a state, especially if such purchases were 
done in order to make those lands fully available for national purposes 
unencumbered by Indian aboriginal title?75 
 
 71. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 58–62; Natelson, supra note 3, at 346–58.  
 72. See, e.g., Michael Lofti, Who Actually “Owns” America’s Land? A Deeper Look at the Bundy 
Ranch Crisis, THE DAILY SHEEPLE (Apr. 13, 2014), http://www.thedailysheeple.com/who-actually 
-owns-americas-land-a-deeper-look-at-the-bundy-ranch-crisis_042014.  
 73. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added). The words “by the consent of the Legislature 
of the State” were added on the floor of the Constitutional Convention. See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 57, at 510; Engdahl, supra note 3, at 288, n.10.  
 74. The principal exception was Texas, which was an independent sovereign when it was 
annexed to the United States in 1845. See infra text accompanying notes 108–109, 431–442.  
 75. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 572–93 (1823) (recounting the history of 
recognition of Indian title to lands from 1492 onward).  
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How does the Enclave Clause relate, if at all, to the Property 
Clause? Is there any significance to the fact that the Enclave Clause is in 
Article I of the Constitution, where most, but not all, of congressional 
powers are listed, while the Property Clause is placed in Article IV, 
alongside Congress’s power to admit new states and various other 
matters?76 
E. THE ENCLAVE CLAUSE IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
No generally accepted answers to those many questions have ever 
been put forward.77 Most important, the courts, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court, have provided almost no guidance on how they should 
be answered. In fact, other than furnishing a basis for the establishment 
of the seat of the national government in the District of Columbia, the 
Enclave Clause has played almost no role in the nation’s affairs, 
including setting policy for the nation’s public lands. 
In his magisterial treatise on the U.S. Constitution, published in 
1833, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story noted that the Clause 
dealt with exclusive jurisdiction, not ownership. Story maintained that 
other parts of the Constitution gave Congress authority to acquire and 
use lands for national purposes. As he wrote, “surely it will not be 
pretended, that congress could not erect a fort, or magazine, in a place 
within a state, unless the state should cede the territory.”78 Even if a 
state acted to prohibit landowners from selling their land to the United 
States, Congress would, according to Story, “possess a constitutional 
right to demand, and appropriate land within the state” for “any public 
purposes indispensable for the Union, either military or civil,” if it paid 
“just compensation.”79 
From early on, the national government and state governments 
generally accepted that the national government had plenary authority 
over negotiations with Indian tribes to resolve their rights to land.80 The 
Enclave Clause was never regarded as bearing on that question. 
For almost a century, the Supreme Court paid little attention to the 
Enclave Clause. Then, in an 1885 decision, Fort Leavenworth Railroad 
v. Lowe,81 the Court, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice 
Stephen J. Field, exhumed it from its obscure grave and, after finding it 
had almost nothing important or useful to say about public land 
 
 76. Engdahl, supra note 3, at 291 n.24 (offering an explanation for this placement); Goble, 
supra note 12, at 499 n.22 (disputing the characterization in Brodie, supra note 3, at 720–21, that 
the placement of these clauses has significance).  
 77. For a general critique of arguments that the Enclave Clause undermines Congress’s power 
over public lands, see Goble, supra note 12, at 498–502. 
 78. JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1141 (1833).  
 79. Id.  
 80. See, e.g., Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 543; see also Ablavsky, supra note 12.  
 81. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885). 
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policymaking, effectively reburied it.82 Field acknowledged that the 
Enclave Clause could be read to prevent the U.S. from acquiring lands 
within a state without that state’s consent.83 “Since the adoption of the 
constitution,” Field dryly observed, “this view has not generally 
prevailed.”84 He went on to note that if “any doubt has ever existed” as 
to the national government’s power in this regard, such doubt “has not 
had sufficient strength to create any effective dissent from the general 
opinion.”85 
In fact, from very early on, the United States acquired land and 
other property inside states for various public purposes without 
obtaining state consent. In 1790, for example, Congress enacted a law 
authorizing the President to purchase a tract of land at West Point in 
New York for military purposes.86 The law made no reference to 
obtaining state consent.87 Ten years before Fort Leavenworth, the 
Court had firmly established the U.S. government’s authority to acquire 
property inside states by eminent domain when needed for proper 
governmental purposes, in a case called Kohl v. United States.88 
In Fort Leavenworth, the Court affirmed the view earlier 
expressed by Justice Story in his treatise, and noted that the power of 
eminent domain upheld in Kohl could not be “dependent upon the 
caprice of individuals, or the will of state legislatures.”89 Field also 
noted that the United States had, from time to time, “reserved certain 
portions” of its “immense domain” from sale or other disposition, in 
order to use those lands to serve national objectives, and this had never 
been seen as raising Enclave Clause issues.90 
There are several hundred instances where states have formally 
ceded exclusive or near-exclusive jurisdiction over particular tracts of 
public lands to the United States. Lands covered by such cessions 
nevertheless constitute but a small fraction of the total acreage of public 
lands.91 In fact, no current compendium of such cessions is maintained 
 
 82. The expression is borrowed from Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the 
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34 (1962). 
 83. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 530–31. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. 1 Stat. 129 (1790).  
 87. Compare William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Authority, 122 YALE L.J. 
1738, 1760–62 (2013), with Christian R. Burset, The Messy History of the Federal Eminent Domain 
Power: A Response to William Baude, 4 CALIF. L. REV. Circuit 187 (2013); see also Ablavsky, supra 
note 12, at § V(C).  
 88. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); see also text accompanying infra notes 318–319. 
 89. Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 531; see also text accompanying notes 78–79 supra. 
 90. Id. at 532. For a full discussion of Fort Leavenworth, see Appel, supra note 12, at 67–71. 
 91. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 3, at 284–87 (discussing a multi-year study by the 
Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States that 
resulted in a two volume report published in 1956 and 1957).  
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anywhere,92 which itself speaks volumes about how little influence the 
Enclave Clause has had on public land policy and management.93 
Since Fort Leavenworth, the Enclave Clause has maintained its 
obscurity and irrelevancy to public land policy. It makes an occasional 
appearance in odd pieces of litigation, but even then usually does not 
control the outcome. In 1899, for example, the Court took up the 
question whether the United States, in operating a military hospital on 
federally-owned land in Ohio, had to abide by state law requiring 
warning labels on oleomargarine.94 As it turned out, Ohio had ceded 
exclusive jurisdiction over this land to the United States in 1868, but 
Congress had relinquished jurisdiction back to Ohio in 1871.95 The 
Court regarded the cession and retrocession as irrelevant, and agreed 
with the military authorities that they were “not subject to the direction 
or control of” the state, because the hospital was “under the direct and 
sole jurisdiction” of the United States.96 
The Court has continued to construe the Enclave Clause as having 
limited force. In its 1938 decision in Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry 
Company, for example, the Court noted with considerable 
understatement that the Clause “has not been strictly construed,” and 
that the U.S. has “large bodies of public lands” that are used for “forests, 
parks, ranges, wild life sanctuaries, flood control, and other purposes 
which are not covered by [the Enclave Clause].”97 In its 1976 decision in 
Kleppe v. New Mexico,98 the Court unanimously rejected New Mexico’s 
argument that the Enclave Clause limited the exercise of Congress’s 
authority under the Property Clause. The latter, the Court observed, 
gives Congress full power to enact legislation respecting public lands, 
and any such legislation “necessarily overrides conflicting state laws 
under the Supremacy Clause.”99 
Given this history, it would be truly stunning were the Supreme 
Court now to decide, after nearly a quarter of a millennium, to give the 
Enclave Clause a meaningful role to play in public land policymaking. 
Apparently the authors of the Utah Paper do not seriously disagree, for 
the Paper gives it almost no attention.100 
 
 92. Engdahl, supra note 3 at 284–85 n.5.  
 93. See PUB. LAND L. REV. COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND 277–79 (1970).  
 94. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899).  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 281, 284.  
 97. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528–30 (1938). Justice McReynolds 
concurred in the result.  
 98. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
 99. Id. at 543; see also id. at 538–43.  
 100. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 99. 
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II.  PUBLIC LAND POLICY UP TO THE CIVIL WAR 
The Utah Paper and others arguing for constitutional restrictions 
on U.S. public land ownership generally pay little attention to the 
history of public land policy in the nation’s early decades. They mostly 
focus simply on the Supreme Court’s 1845 decision in Pollard v. Hagan, 
discussed at some length below.101 But the history of congressional 
policymaking in this era illuminates the constitutional understanding, 
as explained in what follows. 
In the half-century beginning with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, 
through the Gadsden Purchase in 1853, the U.S. acquired the remainder 
of the territory now occupied by the lower forty-eight states.102 As with 
the original public lands west of the crest of the Appalachian Mountains 
to the Mississippi River, these new lands were acquired with the “blood 
and treasure” of the existing states, and were expected to be used for the 
“common benefit” of all the United States. 
All of these lands became public lands owned and administered by 
the national government, with two qualifications and one exception. 
The first qualification had to do with lands that had been granted by the 
sovereign that owned the lands before the United States. The U.S. 
uniformly honored such grants if it determined they were validly made 
and maintained.103 
The second qualification was that many of these lands were subject 
to what came to be known as Indian or aboriginal title, the rightful legal 
claim by Native Americans to lands they had long occupied. Native 
claims had been recognized by the Law of Nations since not long after 
Columbus’s first voyage in 1492.104 Under the Constitution105 and a 
series of so-called “Non-Intercourse Acts” enacted by early 
Congresses,106 only the national government possessed the power to 
purchase or otherwise extinguish Indian title. This monopoly on dealing 
with Indians on land issues helped affirm national power over public 
lands generally.107 
The exception was Texas, where the U.S. took ownership of almost 
no lands, because Texas was an independent nation when the U.S. 
annexed it.108 The statute authorizing Texas’s admission to the Union 
 
 101. See infra text accompanying notes 214–287. 
 102. The story is well-told in RICHARD KLUGER, SEIZING DESTINY (2007); see also GATES, supra 
note 16 at 77–86. 
 103. See GATES, supra note 16, at 87–119. 
 104. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 574 (1823). 
 105. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (vesting Congress with authority to regulate commerce “with the 
Indian Tribes.”).  
 106. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 37–41 (2005 ed.). 
 107. See, e.g., Ablavsky, supra note 12, at 53–55 (forthcoming 2018); see also STUART BANNER, 
HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005).  
 108. See GATES, supra note 16, at 299. 
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specifically and uniquely provided that the new state “shall retain all the 
vacant and unappropriated lands lying within its limits.”109 
The national government had an immense task of sorting through 
many different claims to land in order to establish clear title in the 
United States. Even the western lands ceded to the national government 
by the seven landed states were encumbered with many claims arising 
out of grants purportedly made by those states, and by deals that some 
of them had struck with Indians, before the cessions were effectuated. 
The U.S. made strenuous efforts to resolve all these conflicting rights 
and claims in order to create certain title resting on federal law.110 
During this era, Congress made divestiture the primary objective of 
public land policy. It encouraged the settlement of western lands with 
people loyal to the United States, and thus helped keep the nation 
bound together as it expanded across the landscape. Sale of public lands 
also could generate revenue that would help retire the national debt. In 
fact, however, sales of public land during this era generated 
comparatively little revenue for the U.S. Treasury, compared to the 
tariff or customs duties imposed on imported goods.111 
Congress also gave away many public lands to states, soldiers, 
speculators, squatters, farmers, highway, canal and railroad builders, 
and assorted others. These transfers reflected Congress’s determination 
that they served purposes of great benefit to the nation as a whole. 
Many of them were made on congressionally-specified conditions or 
restrictions in order to carry out national policy objectives like 
promoting public education, national unity, and national defense.112 
Almost from the beginning, however, Congress decided to retain 
some public lands in national ownership, in states as well as in the U.S. 
territories. In terms of the language of the founding documents 
discussed earlier, Congress decided from time to time that it was for the 
“common benefit” of the nation to “dispose of” some public lands by 
“reserving” them in U.S. ownership. The reasons for these so-called 
“reservations” varied, but most of the early ones were to carry out 
Indian, military, and economic policy. Early on, for example, tracts of 
public land containing salt deposits, minerals, hot springs, and forests 
valuable for naval ships and other uses were excluded from divestiture 
programs, and retained in U.S. ownership.113 During this same era, the 
U.S. government sometimes acquired title to other lands inside states, 
 
 109. 5 Stat. 797, 798 (1845).  
 110. See generally Ablavsky, supra note 12. 
 111. See GATES, supra note 16, at 132–36, 142–43, 165–67, 802–03.  
 112. See, e.g., id. at 249–386. 
 113. Id. at 532–34; JENKS CAMERON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL FOREST CONTROL IN 
THE UNITED STATES 28–71 (1928). 
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both the original thirteen and newer admitted states, for similar 
purposes.114 
In the nation’s first several decades, Congress proceeded relatively 
slowly on divestiture measures. It was reluctant simply to throw open 
the public lands to wholesale occupation and settlement, mostly out of 
concern that settlers might not be loyal to the nation. As early as 1804 
and 1807 Congress made it illegal to occupy public lands without U.S. 
permission.115 Divestiture was slowed even more by a financial panic in 
1819 and resulting economic upheaval, which was attributed in part to 
speculative abuses of public land purchases on credit.116 
The relatively slow pace of divestiture brought forth complaints 
from prospective settlers and profit-seeking land speculators.117 In the 
1820s, as the national economy slowly recovered from depression, and 
the national debt was approaching zero, support grew in the newer 
western states for changing public land policy to divest ownership of 
more public lands, faster, and at lower prices. In the late 1820s, this 
coalesced around various proposals that were collectively, and 
somewhat misleadingly, labeled “graduation.” The idea was gradually, 
over a period of years, to reduce the price of public lands offered for sale 
that remained unsold.118 
Meanwhile, older states grew concerned that faster divestiture 
would deprive them of the opportunity to reap value from the public 
lands they still regarded as having been acquired with their “blood and 
treasure.” They began to agitate for what came to be known as 
“distribution,” as in distributing some of the value of public lands 
directly to older states. It took various forms. One idea was to give 
grants of public land in the western regions directly to older states, 
which they could sell. Another was to give older states a direct cut of the 
revenues from public land sales.119 
Generally speaking, members of Congress from newer states 
tended to favor “graduation,” and members from older states favored 
“distribution.” The contest between these two ideas was, however, made 
more complicated by several things. There was continuing pressure 
from squatters who rushed west, occupied public lands, and sought 
title. Laws authorizing conveyances to squatters, which dated back to 
colonial times, were known as “preemption” laws.120 The label was apt, 
 
 114. CAMERON, at 28–71; see also text accompanying supra note 86.  
 115. 2 Stat. 283, 289 § 14 (1804, lands in the Louisiana Territory); 2 Stat. 445 (1807, all public 
lands).  
 116. See DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS 22, 37–38 (1984). 
 117. Id. at 9–21. 
 118. Id. at 68–69. 
 119. Id. at 45–46, 109–12.  
 120. See Ablavsky, supra note 12, at text accompanying n. 92–93 (citing AMELIA CLEWLEY FORD, 
COLONIAL PRECEDENTS OF OUR NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM AS IT EXISTED in 1800 112–42 (1910)).  
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because allowing squatters to buy the public land they were occupying 
in effect preempted the operation of public land laws requiring survey 
before sale by auction or before making land grants to states and others 
for various purposes. Congress had resisted enacting preemption laws 
out of concern that it could lead to settlement by those with 
questionable fidelity to the nation. Over time, as settlement proceeded 
and new states were admitted, this concern diminished somewhat.121 
Another complicating factor was an ongoing, largely sectional 
conflict over tariffs. The South favored lower tariffs to facilitate 
developing overseas markets for its agricultural products. 
Manufacturers, concentrated in New England, favored higher tariffs to 
protect against foreign competition.122 There were also continuing 
disagreements over the extent to which the national government should 
support public works projects like canals and roads inside states―which 
were dubbed “internal improvements”and whether public lands 
should be used to provide such support.123 Finally, the nation’s original 
sinslaveryweighed more and more heavily on all such policy 
discussions, as the cotton kingdom based on slavery became more 
entrenched and the abolition movement gradually gained strength.124 
In his third annual message to Congress in December of 1827, 
President John Quincy Adams noted that more than half of the public 
lands, or about 140 million acres, had been surveyed, and almost twenty 
million acres sold.125 The system by which this “great 
national interest has been managed,” he noted, was the product of 
“long, anxious, and persevering deliberation” that had been “[m]atured 
and modified by the progress of our population and the lessons of 
experience,” and proved “eminently successful.”126 The remaining 
public lands are still, he wrote, “the common property of the union, the 
appropriation and disposal of which are sacred trusts in the hands of 
Congress.”127 Adams was not keen on proposals to accelerate divestiture 
of the public lands. Whereas, in historian Daniel Feller’s phrase, the 
public lands had been a “centripetal force” promoting national unity, 
Adams feared that more divestiture, particularly by means of land 
grants to states, would have a “centrifugal” effect, driving the states 
apart.128 
 
 121. FELLER, supra note 116, at 24, 126–31. 
 122. Id. at 58–59, 86–94. 
 123. Id. at 58–66. See generally Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution: Federalism in 
the Long Founding Moment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 397 (2015).  
 124. FELLER, supra note 116, at 25–26, 94.  
 125. John Quincy Adams, Third Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1827).  
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A. 1827–1830: CONGRESS PAYS NO HEED TO ARGUMENTS PREFIGURING 
THOSE IN THE UTAH PAPER 
While Congress was considering competing proposals for 
graduation, distribution, and preemption, a handful of its members put 
forward, for almost the first time in American history, a core argument 
made in the Utah Paperthat newly admitted states had the 
constitutional right to own all the public lands within their borders 
simply by virtue of being admitted to the Union. The idea was called 
cession, as it called upon the United States to “cede” title to all public 
lands to new states. 
Cession was a much more extreme position than “graduation.” The 
latter called for the Congress to make more public lands available for 
transfer to states, or to private entities, at gradually diminishing prices 
over time. Cession advocates argued that the states (and not private 
entities) had an immediate right to those lands, for free and without 
restriction. A similar argument had been put forward by the state of 
Tennessee not long after it had been admitted to the Union in 1797, but 
Congress rebuffed it, and the argument disappeared from the national 
scene for three decades.129 
A leading advocate of cession was an otherwise obscure freshman 
U.S. Senator from Alabama named John McKinley. One of his 
biographers called him an “enigmatic trimmer,”130 referring to the fact 
that that over his career he switched political affiliations based on 
expediency. “Trimmer” is a nautical term referring to adjusting sails to 
accommodate wind changes. McKinley was, over his political career, by 
turns a devoted Federalist, a supporter of Henry Clay, and finally a 
Jacksonian Democrat.131 Before he advocated cession, he had supported 
“graduation” and using grants of public lands for public works projects 
inside states.132 Starting with a speech in the Senate in February 1827, 
he began to question whether the national government could “control a 
great portion of the land within the limits” of the western states if those 
states were to be on an “equal footing” with the older states.133 
Near the end of March 1828, as the Senate was considering a 
“graduation” proposal, McKinley made “probably the best speech” he 
ever delivered,134 a lengthy, rambling, and at times incoherent 
harangue. In it he offered several different arguments for cession.135 He 
 
 129. See Ablavsky, supra note 12; GATES, supra note 16, at 287–88.  
 130. John Michael Dollar, John McKinley: Enigmatic Trimmer (Sept. 3, 1981) (M.A. thesis, 
Samford University) (on file with author). “Trimmer” is a nautical term. Id. at iii. 
 131. Id. at iii–iv. 
 132. Id. at 91. 
 133. 19 REG. DEB. 315–17 (1827). 
 134. Dollar, supra note 130, at 91. 
 135. 20 REG. DEB. 507–21 (1828).  
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began defensively, acknowledging that in trying to show that the U.S. 
has “no constitutional right or claim to the lands in the new States,” he 
was running directly into the “influence of an established system, long 
in practice, and the force of precedent.”136 Thus, he conceded, some 
would regard his arguments as “wild, visionary, and untenable.”137 He 
then proceeded to offer up a grab-bag of arguments, some half-baked 
and some not baked at all, drawn from a wide variety of legal sources, 
including the law of nations and the U.S. Constitution. 
Ignoring the Property Clause, he called the Enclave Clause the 
Constitution’s “only grant of power” to the U.S. regarding public 
lands.138 He deduced from it and various other sources that title to the 
public lands was automatically transferred to new states upon their 
admission to the Union. He called the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
illegal because, in his view, by maintaining national authority over the 
public lands, it violated the terms by which Virginia ceded its western 
land claims to the United States.139 Even were that not the case, he 
argued, the Ordinance was “repealed and superseded by the 
Constitution of the United States.”140 This ignored the fact that the first 
Congress under the Constitution, exercising its Property Clause power, 
had re-enacted the Ordinance.141 
His most bizarre argument was that it was unconstitutional for 
Congress to insist, as it routinely did,142 that new states agree never to 
interfere with the U.S. disposition of the public lands. The United States 
had “no right to annex any condition whatever to the admission of the 
new States into the Union,” he argued, because the Constitution forbids 
the States from entering into any “treaty, alliance, or confederation.”143 
By the law of nations, he maintained, the states of the union “have no 
power to enter into compacts to abridge their sovereignty,” and if the 
Constitution prohibits the States from making treaties, it is “equally 
prohibitory for the United States to enter into such treaties or compacts 
with the states.”144 This argument ignored the fact that states were not 
states until Congress decided to admit them to the Union.  
Despite such blustery rhetoric, McKinley the “trimmer” had, nine 
days earlierin trying to convince his colleagues to support his bill to 
grant 400,000 acres of public lands to his state of Alabama for 
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 140. Id. at 510. 
 141. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8 1 Stat. 50 (1789). 
 142. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43, 68; see also infra text accompanying notes  
373–375, 423–442. 
 143. 20 REG. DEB. 511–12 (referring to U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10).  
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navigation improvements on its riversconceded that “new states had 
been admitted into the union” on the condition that they “should have 
no sovereignty over” the public lands.145 
At times, McKinley’s speech took the form of a political suicide 
mission. He criticized people in the older stateswhose representatives 
comprised a solid majority of the Congressfor being “ignorant of the 
peculiar wants and wishes” of the people in the newer states and 
territories for whom they were legislating on public lands matters.146 He 
went even further, darkly hinting that newer states might have grounds 
to secede from the Union if they did not get title to the public lands.147 
They would, he told his colleagues, have “good cause to make the same 
complaint, on the subject of the public lands, against the United States, 
that the colonies did against the King of Great Britain.”148 He vowed 
that he and those of like view would “continue to complain until we 
obtain our rights.”149 
A handful of other politicians spoke in favor of cession, and a few 
western state legislatures gave it some support,150 but it went nowhere 
in the Congress or in the nation.151 
Almost two years later, in another floor speech in early 1830, 
Senator McKinley threw in the towel on cession. At first he bragged that 
he had been “the first to advance the doctrine that the new States, in 
virtue of their sovereignty, had a right to the public lands within their 
respective limits, and that the United States could not constitutionally 
hold them.”152 He went on to concede, however, that the question of 
cession had, “for the present,” been “decided against him” by Congress’s 
lack of interest in the subject.153 
McKinley understated the matter. Nearly all his colleagues, and the 
national political establishment, including such disparate figures as 
Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, Albert Gallatin, and 
Andrew Jackson, were absolutely opposed to the idea of ceding all 
public lands to newly admitted states.154 So was one of the primary 
authors of the Constitution, former two-term President James 
Madison.155 
 
 145. Id. at 454 (Mar. 17, 1828). 
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The nearly unanimous rejection of the cession arguments was 
perfectly understandable. According to Daniel Feller, eastern politicians 
were “becoming frankly disgusted” with the westerners’ relentless 
pursuit of benefits from the national government, in language that was 
by turns “haughty and threatening” and “unctuous and flattering.” 
Criticizing some of the newer states for mishandling their generous 
grants of public lands, many eastern members, in Feller’s words, 
“compared the pleas of Westerners to the whining of a spoiled child.”156 
In his response to McKinley’s February 1827 speech, for example, 
Senator John Holmes of Maine suggested the newer states were simply 
dressing up their greed in a constitutional garb.157 He pointedly 
observed that those seeking statehood carefully avoided making such 
claims, because “they well knew that it would be a great argument 
against their admission to the Union.”158 McKinley’s arguments were, 
Holmes said, “absolute heresy; as against the Constitution, against 
reason, and against right.”159 He dismissed the notion that variations in 
public landholdings put newer states on an unequal footing with older 
states. All states were, he said, equal in “point of right,” and the 
Constitution made “perfectly plain” that this was all that was required, 
even if the states were not equal in, as he put it, “point of property.”160 
Southerners were equally dismissive. Congressman William Martin 
of South Carolina vowed to resist the “preposterous claims” of the 
cession advocates.161 One North Carolina Congressman vowed to thwart 
their “grasping usurpations,”162 and another called the constitutional 
argument for cession “one of the most extravagant pretensions that 
could possibly be urged.”163 
Even most members of Congress from the newer states disliked the 
cession argument. They understood the political reality that advocating 
for it did them more harm than good as they pressed the Congress for 
various benefitsmore grants of public lands for a wide variety of 
purposes, lower prices for public land offered for sale, more relief for 
debtors who had purchased public land on credit, and enactment of 
laws giving squatters the right to purchase public landsthat were 
premised on the fact that the national government did in fact own these 
lands. 
Ardent advocates of more liberal divestiture of public lands to 
support western expansion, like President Andrew Jackson and 
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Missouri Senator Thomas Hart Benton, refused to embrace the extreme 
position that all public lands had to be ceded to new states. Benton 
viewed cession as fomenting sectional conflict that could be “most 
destructive to the harmony of the States.”164 He painted a picture of the 
“whole country” becoming “alarmed, agitated, and enraged, with 
mischievous inquires: the South about its slaves and Indians; the West 
about its lands; the Northeast on the subject of its fisheries, its 
navagation [sic], its light houses, and its manufactories. What would be 
the condition of the Union, what the chance for the preservation of 
harmony,” he asked, “if each part struck at the other in a system of 
pernicious and alarming inquiries?”165 
The coup de grace was delivered in early 1830 in the course of the 
Webster-Hayne debate in the United States Senate, one of the most 
famous in all of congressional history.166 While the debate is 
remembered mostly for its discussion of state sovereignty and national 
unity, both Daniel Webster of Massachusetts and Robert Hayne of 
South Carolina took the occasion to cast cold water on the cession 
argument a few days after McKinley’s last major speech on the subject. 
Webster denied that there was “anything harsh or severe in the 
policy of the government towards the new States of the West.”167 On the 
contrary, he said, the U.S. has been “liberal and enlightened” in its 
public land policy,168 and he recounted in detail the cession of the 
western land claims and the understanding of the nation’s founders 
regarding Congress’s power over public lands.169 He strenuously 
challenged the argument that revenue derived from public lands sales 
“consolidates” the national government and “corrupts the people.”170 
Far from corrupting the people, he argued, using public lands to 
promote public education and build canals and roads provides “benefits 
and blessings, which all can see, and all can feel.”171 A use of public 
lands that “opens intercourse, augments population, enhances the value 
of property, and diffuses knowledge” cannot be a “dangerous and 
obnoxious policy.”172 He turned to sarcasm, criticizing those who attack 
public land policy as “hurrying us to the double ruin of,” on the one 
hand, “a Government, turned into despotism by the mere exercise of 
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acts of beneficence,” and on the other, “a people corrupted, beyond 
hope of rescue, by the improvement of their condition.”173 
Hayne criticized cession as “untenable” constitutional nonsense 
that had been put forward “for the first time only a few years ago.”174 He 
acknowledged that states might have grounds for complaining if the 
U.S. continued to hold title to “immense bodies of land” within their 
borders.175 Even then, however, their complaint would be political, not 
legal; that is, it “cannot affect the question of the legal or constitutional 
right” of the U.S. to hold these lands.176 Hayne warned advocates of 
cession that their argument “will never be recognized by the Federal 
Government,” but only trigger a backlash.177 The newer states would 
simply be viewed as greedily grasping for public lands acquired with the 
“blood and treasure” of existing states and intended to be used for the 
“common benefit” of the entire nation. As he delicately put it, the 
argument “will have no other effect than to create a prejudice against 
the claims of the new States,” while they are “constantly looking up to 
Congress for favors and gratuities.”178 
After that, arguments for cession quickly sank, as the leading 
historian of public land policy of that era put it, “like a stone.”179 Some 
years later, President Martin Van Buren noted in his first annual 
message to Congress that the cession argumentwhich he described as 
asserting “that the admission of new States into the Union . . . was 
incompatible with a right of soil in the United States and operated as a 
surrender thereof, notwithstanding the terms of the compacts by which 
their admission was designed to be regulated”had been “wisely 
abandoned.”180 
The lack of political support in Congress for cession was perfectly 
understandable as a matter of raw politics. Members of Congress were 
chosen by those in existing states. Not representing territorial interests 
seeking statehood, they tended to regard the territories as supplicants. 
Members representing older states had no interest in giving most or all 
public lands to new states upon admission, because that did not 
acknowledge their contributions (in “blood and treasure”) to the 
acquisition of these lands from foreign governments and Indian tribes, 
and because they were not convinced that the newly-admitted states 
would in fact use these lands for the “common benefit” of all the states. 
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Members representing newer states with substantial amounts of public 
lands heeded the warnings of their colleagues around the country that 
arguing for cession made them appear avaricious; as Daniel Feller put 
it, the cause “was hopeless; worse yet, the prejudice against it [in the 
Congress] . . . was sabotaging efforts for more modest reform”181 that 
might accelerate divestiture of public lands to settlers and others. 
This political dynamic never changed over time. As once new states 
gradually matured and became more settled, they adopted the attitude 
of older states toward public lands, wanting to ensure that those lands 
be used for the “common benefit” of the nation.182 In 1821, for example, 
in opposing Maryland’s proposal for a “distribution” law, the Ohio 
legislature had argued that it and other newer states had just as much 
claim to the vacant and unappropriated lands in the old states as those 
old states had in the public lands within the newer states’ borders. But 
by 1830 Ohio, now increasingly settled, had ceased to be a western 
state, economically and culturally, and its elected representatives took 
positions on public lands issues that were closer to those of the older 
states than newer ones.183 
Those who question the constitutionality of public lands usually 
pay little attention to this rich and instructive history. The Utah Paper, 
for example, quotes only from a House Public Land Committee report 
from 1828 on a “graduation” bill that spoke of an “implied engagement 
of Congress” to cause public lands “to be sold, within a reasonable 
time.”184 Others cite advocates of cession or related materials,185 but 
without noting either the context or the resultthat the argument was a 
political rather than a legal one, and that it fell flat in the Congress. 
After the Civil War, as the U.S. began to retain more and more public 
lands in national ownership, some in the newer states from time to time 
revived arguments for cession, but had no more success than before.186 
B. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S VIEW OF NATIONAL POWER OVER PUBLIC 
LANDS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 
Before the Civil War, the U.S. Supreme Court generally recognized 
that Congress had very broad authority over lands to which the U.S. 
took title, with two principal exceptions discussed further below.187 The 
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Court’s first important decisions regarding public lands had to do with 
the property rights of Native Americans. It decided not only that 
Indians had rights to territory they had traditionally occupied, but that 
resolution of their claims to land was “committed exclusively to the 
government of the union,” and not the states, by the “settled principles 
of our constitution.”188 
In its 1839 decision in Wilcox v. Jackson,189 the Court unanimously 
upheld the executive branch’s practice of appropriating or reserving 
public lands inside states for military use, for erecting trading houses 
with Indians, and for constructing lighthouses. While Congress by that 
point had begun enacting “preemption” laws authorizing the sale of 
public land to squatters under certain circumstances,190 it had typically 
carefully excluded from the operation of such laws public lands that had 
“been reserved for the use of the United States,” or “reserved from sale 
by act of Congress, or by order of the President, or which may have been 
appropriated for any purpose whatsoever. . . .”191 
The next year, 1840, the Court decided United States v. Gratiot.192 
The case arose when the United States sued to recover a fee owed by 
industrialists who were smelting lead removed from public lands in the 
state of Illinois under lease from the United States. The industrialists 
defended the lawsuit by advancing one of the major arguments of the 
Utah Paper; namely, that the Property Clause gives Congress “the power 
only to sell, and not to lease such lands,” and so the United States had 
no right to collect the fee.193 
The lower court’s decision in Gratiot was written by Supreme 
Court Justice John McLean, sitting as Circuit Justice.194 McLean, who 
had been Commissioner of the General Land Office in the early 1820s, 
noted in his opinion that “at one time” arguments had been made that 
public lands “rightfully belonged to the state[s],” apparently referring to 
the cession arguments John McKinley and others had made in Congress 
in 1827–1830.195 McLean concluded that the Property Clause “was 
intended to secure the exercise of the power over the property of the 
Union within the states,” and was unaffected by the admission of a new 
state to the Union.196 
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Wheat) 543 (1823).  
 189. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. 498 (1839). 
 190. See text accompanying notes 120–121 supra.  
 191. Wilcox, 38 U.S. at 511 (quoting the Preemption Act, 4 Stat. 420 (1830)).  
 192. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840). 
 193. Id. at 538.  
 194. United States v. Gratiot, 26 F. Cas. 12 (D. Ill. 1839).  
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. 
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In the Supreme Court, the industrialists’ lawyer, Missouri Senator 
Thomas Hart Benton, told the Court that the public lands “are ‘to be 
disposed of’ by Congress; not ‘held by the United States.’” This meant, 
Benton argued, that the “Constitution gives the power of disposal; and 
disposal is not letting or leasing.”197 He went on to argue that Congress’s 
power in the Property Clause to “make all needful Rules and 
Regulations” respecting the public lands referred only to “the power to 
dispose of the lands. The rules are to carry the disposal into effect; to 
protect them; to explore them; to survey them.”198 
In response, the U.S. Attorney General argued that the “unusually 
broad” language of the Property Clause of the Constitution fully 
justified Congress’s exercise of sweeping authority over the public 
lands.199 He pointed out that the “whole management of the public 
domain rests upon these few words,” which has allowed Congress to 
cede public lands “for special purposes,” to fix “limitations . . . on the 
sovereign powers of the states,” to set aside “school lands,” to keep 
“timber and salt-springs” for “public use,” and to permanently secure 
the “spots on which many of our fortifications and public buildings are 
placed.”200 Because “[a]ll this has been done, in repeated instances, for 
nearly sixty years,” the Attorney General warned, it would be an 
“unwarranted restriction” to “confine the language of the Constitution, 
therefore, to a mere delegation to Congress of a power to sell the 
territory, or to examine and prepare it for sale.”201 
Benton’s arguments failed to persuade a single Justice. The Court 
unanimously held that the Property Clause gave Congress power over 
public lands “without limitation,” that their “disposal must be left to the 
discretion of Congress,” and that Illinois “cannot claim a right to the 
public lands within her limits.”202 
As it happened, former Alabama Senator John McKinley was 
serving on the Supreme Court when Gratiot was decided, having been 
appointed by Martin Van Buren in 1837. He did not, however, 
participate in Gratiot or any other cases during that term, apparently 
because of illness.203 
The Utah Paper dismisses the Court’s statement in Gratiot that 
Illinois had no claim to the reserved public lands as without 
“precedential value,” because it was “not the result of briefing, 
argument and deliberation.”204 Benton’s argument about the meaning 
 
 197. Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 532. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 537–38.  
 203. See 39 U.S. at vii (Court Reporter’s notes showing which justices were absent this term). 
 204. HOWARD ET AL., supra 4, at 93–94. 
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of the Property Clause is, however, clearly set out in the official report of 
the case.205 
Two years after Gratiot, the Court decided Martin v. Waddell.206 It 
did not address the Property Clause, but deserves brief consideration 
here because it is a precursor to Pollard v. Hagan, the centerpiece of 
the Utah Paper’s constitutional argument. Martin claimed the right to 
harvest oysters in rivers and bays in New Jersey under laws enacted by 
the state of New Jersey in 1824.207 Waddell claimed ownership of the 
oyster beds under a grant tracing back to the 17th century rulers of 
England, who had chartered the colony of New Jersey.208 
The Court ruled in favor of Martin. The majority opinion by Chief 
Justice Taney, applying what it called “settled” English law, concluded 
that the grant from the Crown to Waddell’s predecessor in title could 
not have conveyed ownership of the beds of navigable waters merely as 
private property, because the Crown retained “dominion and property 
in navigable waters, and in the lands under them,” as a “public trust” 
that must be administered “for the common benefit.”209 Careful analysis 
by Professor James Rasband has undermined the Court’s summary of 
English law on this point.210 Rasband concludes that English law 
created only a presumption against alienation rather than a prohibition 
of it.211 
The Court in Martin went on to hold that, once the U.S. became 
independent from England, the thirteen original states, including New 
Jersey, succeeded to the Crown’s position.212 These states thus held 
“absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them, 
for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered 
by the constitution to the general government,” that is, the United 
States.213 
The United States was not a party to Martin v. Waddell, so any 
interest it might have claimed in the submerged lands at issue was not 
before the Court. 
 
 205. Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 532. 
 206. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). 
 207. Id. at 369. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 411. 
 210. Rasband, supra note 45, at 25–29.  
 211. Id. at 11–14; see also James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient TruthsA History of the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 69–80 (2007).  
 212. Martin, 41 U.S. at 367.  
 213. Id. at 140. Justices Thompson, who wrote the Court’s opinion in Gratiot, and Baldwin; 
dissented.  
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C. POLLARD V. HAGAN 
On January 1, 1845, the Court issued its decision in Pollard  
v. Hagan.214 Dicta in the majority opinion furnish the principal support 
for the Utah Paper and articles making a similar argument. Specifically, 
the majority opinion made several broad and startlingly novel 
assertions about the U.S. Constitution that were not only completely at 
odds with historical practice and understanding, but went far beyond 
what was necessary to decide the case before the Court. As a result, 
these pronouncements had little influence on future public land policy. 
The Utah Paper nevertheless relies heavily on them.215 
The question presented was whether the principle announced in 
Martin applied to submerged lands in Alabama, admitted in 1819. Here 
the authority of the United States was at issue, because Pollard claimed 
title under a grant from the U.S. in 1836. Hagan claimed title under a 
grant the state of Georgia had made to his predecessor in 1795, when 
the land was still part of Georgia’s western land claims,216 claims that 
were not finally ceded to the U.S. until 1802. Neither the U.S. nor the 
State of Alabama was, however, a party in Pollard. 
There was no compelling reason for the Court in Pollard to extend 
Martin’s principle to Alabama and other states admitted after the U.S. 
was established. The original states had, by virtue of their colonial 
charters, a direct relationship with the rulers of England. New states 
admitted after the original thirteen had no such relationship, because 
the United States had come in between these new states and the foreign 
governments that originally laid claim to these lands (subject, of course, 
to Native American claims). This gave the United States a powerful 
argument that it, and not the newer-admitted states, succeeded to the 
foreign governments’ ownership of submerged lands. Moreover, 
Georgia had ceded its western land claims, including the lands 
submerged under navigable waters, to the U.S. well before Alabama was 
admitted to the Union. All this arguably gave the United States plenary 
power to choose whether to convey the land to new states, or to 
grantees like Pollard, or to retain ownership for public purposes. 
The majority in Pollard ignored these reasons for not extending 
Martin v. Waddell, and held for Hagan. It concluded that  
 
 214. See id.  
 215. See, e.g., HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 11, 73 (Pollard is the “seminal case”), 80, 89–90, 
92–93, 108–10. 
 216. Actually, whether the submerged land at issue in Pollard was part of Georgia’s western land 
claim had been disputed in an earlier, related piece of litigation. Spain’s ownership of the Florida 
region had given it a claim to that land at issue in Pollard, but the Supreme Court had decided five 
years earlier that its claim had already been settled by agreement with the United States. See 
Pollard’s Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 378–81 (1840). For a more detailed review of the lengthy 
dispute that culminated in Pollard, see Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the 
Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1312–15 (2009).  
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newly-admitted states, like the original thirteen, automatically became 
owners of the beds of navigable waters upon their admission to the 
Union. 
Pollard’s majority opinion was written by none other than Justice 
John McKinley, who as a U.S. Senator seventeen years earlier had 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade his colleagues to support cession. 
McKinley is widely regarded as one of the most obscure and least 
productive Justices in the annals of the Court.217 In fourteen years on 
the bench, he wrote fewer than two dozen opinions, including 
dissents.218 His opinion in Pollard, covering eleven pages of the U.S. 
Reports, was the longest of his judicial career219 and, according to one 
biographer, “the majority opinion for which he is best known.”220 
Historian Carl Swisher noted that McKinley was “hampered by 
poor health and serious illnesses.”221 At the time, Supreme Court 
Justices spent considerable time riding circuit in the hinterlands. 
McKinley himself had by far the largest circuit to traverse, a “burden,” 
Swisher noted, about “which he perennially complained.”222 While 
riding circuit may have interfered with opinion writing, Swisher 
surmised that McKinley’s limited productivity might have been a “sheer 
lack of ability” for which circuit riding simply provided a convenient 
excuse.223 Swisher’s ultimate assessment was that McKinley made “no 
significant contribution to legal thinking in any form.”224 
 
 217. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 481, 501–02 (1983); see also 39 U.S. at vii; 42 U.S. at lxxi; 47 U.S. at unnumbered page 
following title pages (court reporter’s notes show that over his fourteen year tenure, McKinley 
participated in no cases in four different Supreme Court terms, 1840, 1843, 1848 and 1850). 
 218. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 466, 472 (1983). 
 219. Easterbrook, supra note 217, at 500 (Appendix D).  
 220. STEVEN P. BROWN, JOHN MCKINLEY AND THE ANTEBELLUM SUPREME COURT: CIRCUIT RIDING IN 
THE OLD SOUTHWEST 202 (2012). 
 221. CARL B. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY 
PERIOD: 1836–64 67 (1974).  
 222. Id. at 66–67; see also BROWN, supra note 220, at 6–7. Swisher also described how 
McKinley, while on the Court, purportedly to “promote convenience of travel,” had moved his home 
from Alabama to Louisville, Kentucky, outside his circuit, where he was a member of a 
manufacturing firm. Id. In his Reporter’s notes in Volume 49 of the U.S. Reports, Howard had 
incorrectly attributed McKinley’s absence from the Court’s January 1850 Term to illness. He 
corrected the record in Volume 50. Compare 49 U.S. (8 How.) iii n. superscript * (1850), with 50 
U.S. (9 How.) iii (1851) (“ERRATUM. The note in the eighth volume, stating that ‘Mr. Justice 
McKinley was prevented, by indisposition, from attending the Court during the January term, 1850,’ 
is incorrect; as Mr. McKinley was engaged during that period in holding an important session of the 
U.S. Circuit Court at New Orleans.”). See Easterbrook, supra note 217, at 491 n.40.  
 223. SWISHER, supra note 221, at 262.  
 224. Id. at 67; see also Herbert U. Feibelman, John McKinley of AlabamaLegislator, U.S. 
Congressman, Senator, Supreme Court Justice, 22 ALA. LAWYER 422, 424 (1961) (“Not one of the 
decisions . . . involved a major constitutional question”); BROWN, supra note 220, at 9–10 (arguing 
that McKinley has been unduly disparaged, but concedes that none of his opinions were “landmark 
in nature”).  
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McKinley had created a stir shortly after joining the Court when, 
sitting as circuit justice, he held that an out-of-state corporation could 
not enforce contracts made within a state without that state’s approval. 
When he learned of this judgment, one of his Supreme Court colleagues, 
John McLean, wrote to another colleague, Joseph Story, expressing 
serious concern that national financial establishment interests would 
lose confidence in the courts if the judgment were to stand, and 
disparaged McKinley’s apparent metamorphosis from an extreme 
Federalist to an equally extreme advocate of states’ rights.225 On review, 
the Supreme Court reversed McKinley.226 
McKinley’s disjointed, muddled opinion in Pollard was described 
by Professor James Rasband in 1997 as “hardly a model of clarity,” with 
“broad dicta” that had “little to recommend it.”227 By “serving up broad 
dicta rather than carefully addressing the precise issue before it,” 
Rasband observed with some understatement, McKinley’s opinion 
“stumbled into error and injected confusion into the law.”228 A similar 
conclusion was reached by a legal commentator in 1851, who called 
McKinley’s dicta in Pollardthat Congress had little authority over 
public landsa “radical error” that was not supported by “argument or 
authority,” and “clearly mistaken.”229 
McKinley asserted that in “any of the new states,” the U.S. had a 
“right of soil” only for “temporary purposes,” to execute the “trusts” 
created by the “deeds of cession” from the states like Georgia with 
western land claims, and the “trust created by the treaty” by which the 
U.S. made the Louisiana Purchase.230 Quoting from those “deeds of 
cession” and from the clauses of the Constitution dealing with the 
admission of new states and Enclaves,”231 he asserted that every new 
state could exercise the same governmental powers as the original 
states, “except so far as they are, temporarily, deprived of control over 
the public lands.”232 
McKinley went on to claim that the cessions of western lands by 
the original states had only two narrow purposes. The first was to bind 
the United States to convert the public lands ceded to it “into money for 
the payment of the [national] debt,” and the second was “to erect new 
 
 225. Dollar, supra note 130, at 189 (citing a May 5, 1838 letter from McLean to Story in the Story 
papers in the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston); see also BROWN, supra note 220, at  
151–56; 160–63.  
 226. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839).  
 227. Rasband, supra note 45, at 36. 
 228. Id.  
 229. See Henry F. Page, Power of Congress over Shores of Rivers, 8 W. L.J. 346, 351 (1851).  
 230. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 221 (1845).  
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. 
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states over the territory thus ceded.”233 He wrote that “as soon as these 
purposes could be accomplished the power of the United States over 
these lands, as property, was to cease.”234 Once the U.S. “shall have fully 
executed these trusts,” in other words, the “municipal sovereignty of the 
new states will be complete, throughout their respective borders, and 
they, and the original states, will be upon an equal footing, in all 
respects whatever.”235 
McKinley’s opinion mentions the Constitution’s Property Clause, 
but gives it an interpretation that the Court specifically rejected in its 
unanimous decision in Gratiot236 five years earlier. That is, McKinley 
seems to accept Senator Benton’s argument in that casean argument 
the Court curtly rejectedthat the Property Clause gives Congress the 
power only to make “rules and regulations respecting the sales and 
disposition of the public lands,” implicitly defining “disposition” to 
mean only divestiture.237 
McKinley’s sweeping Pollard dicta was also at odds with a view 
McKinley himself had expressed for the Court only four years earlier. In 
United States v. Fitzgerald,238 McKinley ruled in favor of a person who 
obtained title to formerly public land in the State of Louisiana under a 
federal preemption law, because the evidence showed that the U.S. had 
“neither reserved” the land in question “from sale nor appropriated [it] 
to any purpose whatever.”239 But McKinley also noted, citing the 
Property Clause, that if the government had earlier reserved or 
appropriated the land for its own use, it would have prevailed under the 
Court’s 1839 decision in Wilcox v. Jackson.240 
McKinley’s Pollard opinion also ignored the Court’s unanimous 
decision in United States v. Gear,241 handed down a few weeks earlier. 
Gear followed the Court’s earlier decision in Wilcox v. Jackson,242 and 
held that because mineral lands the U.S. reserved by the 1807 
legislation upheld in Gratiot were not subject to the divestiture laws, 
the lower court properly enjoined removal of minerals from them 
without U.S. approval.243 
McKinley’s opinion twice referred to provisions in statehood 
enabling acts, including Alabama’s, that required new states to disclaim 
 
 233. Id. at 224.  
 234. Id.  
 235. Id. 
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 192–205.  
 237. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 225.  
 238. United States v. Fitzgerald, 40 U.S. 407 (1841). 
 239. Id. at 421.  
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 189–191. 
 241. United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. 120 (1845). 
 242. See supra text accompanying notes 189–191.  
 243. Gear, 44 U.S. at 120. 
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“all right and title to” the public lands the U.S. retains within their 
borders.244 He eventually concluded, without elaboration, that no 
“compact” between Alabama and the United States “could diminish or 
enlarge” the right to ownership of the lands at issue in Pollard.245 This 
was because, he wrote, to deny Alabama the ownership of the beds of 
navigable waters would be “to deny that Alabama has been admitted 
into the union on an equal footing with the original states,” because the 
Court had already concluded in Martin v. Waddell that the original 
states owned the beds of navigable waters.”246 
McKinley’s opinion was the first time a Supreme Court opinion had 
referred to “equal footing” among the states.247 As discussed earlier, 
while the “equal footing” idea dated back to the 1780s, the idea that it 
gave states some sort of claim to equal treatment as far as the U.S. 
public lands were concerned was completely at odds with the 
understanding of the nation’s founders and the practice that had 
prevailed since the nation’s founding.248 McKinley cited no precedent, 
and his turbid discussion left it, as Professor Hanna put it in 1951, “by 
no means certain” what he was saying regarding landholdings.249 
The similarities between McKinley’s muddled political arguments 
for cession in the Senate from 1827 to 1830 and his sweeping, legally 
novel dicta in Pollard are unmistakable. Of course he was not the first, 
nor would he be the last, Justice to convert political arguments into 
pronouncements on the meaning of the Constitution. The contemporary 
political landscape suggests, however, that McKinley’s agenda may have 
been far more ambitious than simply awarding new states the right to 
take title to all public lands.  
Pollard was handed down a few weeks after the 1844 presidential 
election in which Democrat James K. Polk narrowly defeated Whig 
Henry Clay. Seven years earlier, when he was Speaker of the House, 
Polk had urged Andrew Jackson to appoint John McKinley to the 
Supreme Court. Jackson had demurred, and appointed someone else, 
but when that nomination was declined, Jackson’s successor Martin 
Van Buren appointed McKinley to the bench. This was not long, 
ironically, before Van Buren noted that arguments like then-Senator 
 
 244. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 224, 229 (1845).  
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 229. 
 247. See Rasband, supra note 45, at 36; Whittington, supra note 216, at 1314 (“Pollard gave 
judicial articulation to the ‘equal footing’ doctrine.”). Nine years before Pollard, the Court had 
cryptically spoken of Louisiana’s admission on the “same footing” as other states in deciding that, 
under Spanish Law, the City of New Orleans rather than the U.S. owned a parcel of land in the City. 
Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 736–37 (1836). McKinley’s Pollard opinion did 
not cite this case.  
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 38–62, 129–186. 
 249. Hanna, supra note 45, at 531.  
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McKinley had made in Congress for cession had been “wisely 
abandoned.”250 
The central issue in the 1844 presidential contest was whether and 
how fast the United States would expand west; specifically, whether it 
would annex Texas and seek to acquire other territory out to the Pacific. 
The expansion issue was inextricably bound up with the question 
whether the practice of slavery would be allowed in the newly-acquired 
areas, or in states admitted from them. Beginning with the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, Congress had always assumed the power to dictate 
whether slavery could be practiced in the territories, and the Property 
Clause was generally accepted as the source of this authority.251 The 
famous Missouri Compromise of 1820, by which Congress had 
purported to ban slavery north of a line it drew on the map in the 
western territory, had wide support when it was adopted, including 
from representatives of slavery interests like John Calhoun of South 
Carolina.252 
But the debate intensified as the slavery-dependent cotton 
kingdom sought to expand, the abolition movement gained strength, 
and sectional tensions rose. Increasingly the argument over slavery and 
national expansion was made in terms of what the Constitution allowed 
Congress to do. As historian Don Fehrenbacher put it, the “crucial 
change in the slavery controversy occurring during the 1840s” was “not 
the introduction of new principles or formulas, but rather the 
constitutionalizing of the argument.”253 
Polk’s victory in the 1844 election signaled that expansion was 
likely inevitable, as was the need for Congress to confront the issue of 
slavery in the west.254 Several different positions were urged by slave 
interests, abolitionists, and others who were simply trying to keep the 
Union from splitting apart on this issue. The most extreme pro-slavery 
position was that Congress had no power over slavery. The most 
extreme anti-slavery position was that Congress had plenary power over 
the matter, both in the territories and, through conditions it could 
attach to statehood enabling acts, inside newly-admitted states. A 
middle ground was that each territory or new state could decide the 
matter for itself.255 
 
 250. See Frank Otto Gatell, John McKinley, in 1 JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 
1789–1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 769, 773 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969); 
Dollar, supra note 130, at 184–85. Regarding Van Buren’s comments on cession, see supra note 180.  
 251. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW, AND POLITICS: THE DRED SCOTT CASE IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 74–88 (1981). 
 252. Id. at 101–13. 
 253. Id. at 140.  
 254. Id. at 124–27.  
 255. See generally id. at 137–47. 
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There was a related question, closely connected to the slavery 
debate: whether the United States had authority to acquire property by 
eminent domain, and whether this might be an avenue toward 
abolition.256 In this respect, it is noteworthy that McKinley’s Pollard 
opinion at one point stated it was “necessary to enter into a more 
minute examination of the rights of eminent domain, and the right to 
public lands.”257 The relevance of “rights of eminent domain” to the 
narrow issue before the Court in Pollard was obscure at best, and 
McKinley never clarified the matter.258 He added to the mystery by 
capaciously defining “eminent domain,” which he put in italics, as the 
“right which belongs to the society, or to the sovereign, of disposing, in 
case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the wealth contained in 
the state.”259 
To be sure, Pollard did not, on its face, have anything to do with 
slavery any more than it did the subject of eminent domain, however 
defined. But because the extent of Congress’s power over public lands 
and other property in new states, as well as its power of eminent 
domain, had become of great importance to slavery’s defenders, it is not 
at all far-fetched to suggest that one of McKinley’s objectives in his 
discursive Pollard opinion was to cut short, or at least influence, 
congressional debate over the status of slavery in the western lands. The 
more limited Congress’s authority was under the Property Clause, 
especially vis-à-vis the admission of new states, the more difficult it 
would be for Congress to limit or abolish slavery in newly-acquired 
territories, or states created out of them. In this connection, it is worth 
noting that the first time McKinley had put forth arguments about 
cession in the Senate in 1827, eighteen years before Pollard, he had 
pointedly referred to the Missouri Compromise in raising the question 
of whether Congress could “fix any condition on the admission of new 
State into the Union” if that would “impair the sovereignty of the 
State.”260 
McKinley’s Pollard opinion might, in other words, have been 
prefiguring the Supreme Court’s direct intervention in the slavery 
controversy a dozen years later in its Dred Scott decision.261 And if that 
was his agenda, he might have been pleased to see his Pollard opinion 
referred to in congressional debates, court decisions, and opinions of 
 
 256. See, e.g., Betty L. Fladeland, Compensated Emancipation: A Rejected Alternative, 42 J. S. 
HIST. 169, 171–73 (1976); Burset, supra note 87, at 198–99. 
 257. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222 (1845). 
 258. Hanna, supra note 45, at 531. For the scholarly debate about the existence and extent of the 
national government’s authority to acquire land through eminent domain before the Civil War, see 
works cited supra note 87.  
 259. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 223. 
 260. 19 REG. DEB. 316 (1827). 
 261. See infra text accompanying notes 288–305.  
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the U.S. Attorney General on matters that related to the slavery issue in 
the years that followed.262 But if McKinley thought that his Pollard 
opinion might have laid such questions to rest, he was sadly mistaken, 
for if anything it seemed simply to increase the intensity of the national 
debate on the future of slavery. 
McKinley was no stranger to politics. His shift in allegiance from 
Henry Clay to Andrew Jackson had helped him secure his first election 
to the Senate back in 1826.263 He was the first U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice ever to have previously served in the U.S. House, Senate, and a 
state legislature. Moreover McKinley was, as constitutional historian 
Carl Swisher rather tactfully put it, “no rebel against Southern 
institutions.”264 According to one of McKinley’s biographers, the 1830 
federal census showed him owning three slaves, and the 1850 census 
showed him owning eighteen slaves, nine of which were listed as 
fugitives.265 This biographer observed that when McKinley became a 
follower of Andrew Jackson in the mid-1820s, he also became a “very 
loud proponent of states’ rights,” and over time, as the South “felt more 
and more the loss of sovereignty to the central government, his cheers 
for states’ rights became a loud roar.”266 
When McKinley served in the House and the Senate intermittently 
for nearly a decade from 1826 on, the issue of slavery was rarely 
debated. Still, in one of his last speeches in Congress, as a member of 
the House in February 1835, he had strongly objected to that body 
considering what he called an “impudent” petition to abolish slavery in 
the District of Columbia that had been proposed by “a firebrand from 
one of the Northern States.”267 The Congress had no right, he said at 
that time, to lay its “hands upon his property.”268 
Near the beginning of his opinion in Pollard, McKinley seemed to 
allude to the heated, ongoing debate about the future of slavery in the 
territories and new states to be carved out of them, by noting that the 
issue before the Courtwhich appeared to be a pedestrian dispute over 
ownership of a tract of submerged land in Alabamawas of “great 
importance to all the states of the union, and particularly the new 
ones.”269 
Justice Catron’s dissent from what he called the “startling novelty” 
of McKinley’s sweeping assertions in Pollard likewise lends some 
support to the idea that McKinley had a bigger, more political 
 
 262. See Burset, supra note 87, at 200–02. 
 263. BROWN, supra note 220, at 59, 62–63.  
 264. SWISHER, supra note 221, at 532.  
 265. Dollar, supra note 130, at 174 n.22.  
 266. Id. at 203. 
 267. 23 REG. DEB. 1395 (1835). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 220 (1845). 
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agenda.270 McKinley’s construction of the Constitution was, Catron 
wrote, “so obscure” that it had “lain dormant, and even unsuspected, for 
so many years.” Catron criticized McKinley not only for seeming to 
overthrow prior Court decisions “either directly or in effect,” but also 
because he “declared void” an act of Congress that had purported to 
settle title to the submerged lands at issue. This was one of the rare 
times in the nation’s first few decades that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
voided an act of Congress on constitutional grounds.271 
To be sure, Catron noted, McKinley’s dicta had not been unknown 
“in the political discussions in the country,” which presumably was a 
delicate way to reference the arguments for cession that then-Senator 
McKinley and others had made in 1827–1830. But those questions, 
Catron wrote, should continue to be left to “the political departments” 
of the government.272 “[N]o state complains, nor has any one ever 
complained,” he wrote, “of the infraction of her political and sovereign 
rights” by the U.S. in executing the “great trust” imposed on it “to 
dispose of the public domain for the common benefit.”273 
Catron was also clear-eyed about the possible incendiary effects of 
McKinley’s view of the Constitution. Because neither Alabama nor the 
U.S. was a party to the case, it was, in his view, particularly 
inappropriate for the Court to decide in favor of a “mere trespasser in 
the midst of a city” who was asserting what he called the state’s 
sovereign right simply “for his individual protection, in sanction of the 
trespass.”274 McKinley was, Catron charged, stirring up conflict between 
states and the national government where none existed: “The states and 
the United States are not in hostility; the people of the one are also the 
people of the other.”275 
The implications of McKinley’s sweeping statements were 
particularly troublesome, Catron wrote, insofar as they purported to 
apply “to the high lands of the United States” as well as to submerged 
lands, because of “the amount of property involved.”276 
Unfazed by or perhaps unaware of the warnings in Catron’s 
dissent, McKinley’s opinion never addressed the revolutionary 
implications of its sweeping assertions. If national power over public 
lands was so limited, what was the legal status of military bases, and the 
public land areas set aside for Indians, and the mineral lands and other 
reservations of public land the U.S. had made since 1787? Were they 
 
 270. Id. at 232. 
 271. See Whittington, supra note 216, at 1267.  
 272. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 232. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 231–32, 235. 
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still valid?277 Did it make any difference whether the public lands were 
reserved before or after a new state was created? What was the status of 
the many millions of acres of public land the U.S. still owned in 
Alabama and other new states? What was the effect on all those land 
grants, which totaled millions of acres, the U.S. had already made inside 
new states before or after they were admitted to the Union, many of 
which included conditions and restrictions? 
Catron’s trenchant criticism of McKinley’s dicta invites speculation 
as to why his lone dissent did not attract support from other Justices. 
One answer might be found in the last paragraph of McKinley’s opinion. 
There, following nearly two dozen paragraphs laden with sweeping 
declarations that Congress’s power over public lands was very limited, 
was the statement that the “preceding course of reasoning” had led the 
Court to reach quite narrow conclusions, to wit: 
First, The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them, were 
not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were 
reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, The new states have the 
same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the 
original states. Thirdly, The right of the United States to the public 
lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and 
regulations for the sale and disposition thereof, conferred no power to 
grant to the plaintiffs the land in controversy in this case.278 
In the end, then, all the Court actually decided in Pollard was to 
extend its previous decision in Martin v. Waddell279 to states admitted 
after the original thirteen. McKinley’s narrow conclusion sidestepped 
some of the problems identified in Catron’s dissent, should McKinley’s 
sweeping dicta be applied to public lands other than land submerged 
under navigable waters. The narrowness of the decision seemed to be 
confirmed the next year, when Justice Catron wrote a decision for a 
unanimous Court holding that a state law cutting off actions to recover 
possession of property did not apply to resolve a dispute between two 
private claimants over who had the better claim to certain public lands 
in the state of Louisiana.280 Without referring to Pollard, Catron 
concluded that state law did not apply because the Property Clause gave 
Congress “power of disposal and of protection” of the public lands, 
which meant that “Congress alone can deal with the title, and no State 
law, whether of limitations or otherwise, can defeat such title.”281 
 
 277. Among those reservations was one that Congress had made of public land at Hot Springs, 
Arkansas, in 1832, four years before Arkansas became a state. In 1848, in failing health, McKinley 
spent several days recuperating there. BROWN, supra note 220, at 210–11.  
 278. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230. 
 279. See supra text accompanying notes 206–213.  
 280. Jourdan v. Barrett, 45 U.S. 169, 184–85 (1846).  
 281. Id. at 185.  
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Disregard of Pollard’s dicta is also apparent in an opinion Supreme 
Court Justice McLean rendered in 1852 as a Circuit Justice. In that case, 
McLean rejected the argument that the state of Michigan, “by virtue of 
her sovereignty, had a right to all the lands within her limits,” noting 
that the argument had been made in political debates several years 
earlier, where it was “received everywhere with less favor than its 
advocates anticipated.”282 As a “question of law,” McLean wrote, “we 
have no hesitancy in saying the argument is groundless. The state of 
Michigan can exercise no power whatever over the public lands within 
her limits. She is expressly prohibited from doing this by a compact 
agreed to in the admission of the state into the Union.”283 
Given all this, what is one to make of McKinley’s sweeping dicta 
that preceded Pollard’s narrow conclusion? This was in an era in which, 
according to historian G. Edward White, one Justice would typically 
prepare an opinion of the Court, but not circulate it to the other Justices 
before delivering and dispatching it to the Court’s reporter for eventual 
publication.284 The “different jurisprudential universe” that then 
prevailed, White points out, “meant that the reasoning of an opinion of 
the Court . . . usually represented only the view of one Justice.”285 This 
gave judicial opinions “diminished status” as precedents.286 
As it turned out, the extent to which the McKinley’s sweeping dicta 
reflected anything more than his own views made no difference. As 
discussed in more detail below, the Court has paid very little attention 
to his assertions in the public lands context.287 
D. DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD 
With this fateful 1857 decision, handed down a dozen years after 
Pollard, the Supreme Court inserted itself even more directly in the 
debate over slavery and the breadth of Congress’s Property Clause 
power.288 Scott, born a slave, had lived for years in the free territory of 
Wisconsin, where slavery was forbidden under the terms of the 
Missouri Compromise, as well as in the free state of Illinois. He 
petitioned for his freedom when his master took him back to the state of 
Missouri, where slavery was lawful. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion 
rejecting Scott’s claim was the most prominent of the several opinions 
written by various Justices in the case.289 It is mostly remembered for 
 
 282. Turner v. Am. Baptist Missionary Union, 24 F. Cas. 344, 345 (C.C.D. Mich. 1852).  
 283. Id. 
 284. G. Edward White, The Internal Powers of the Chief Justice: The Nineteenth-Century 
Legacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1463, 1477–84 (2006). 
 285. Id. at 1482–83 (emphasis removed). 
 286. Id. at 1483. 
 287. See infra text accompanying notes 350–370.  
 288. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 289. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 251; Landever, supra note 3, at 9, 41. McKinley had died five 
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its assertion that, at the time the U.S. Constitution was framed and 
adopted, not just slaves but the entire “unfortunate race” of African-
Americans had “been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and 
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or 
political relations, and so far unfit that they had no rights which the 
white man was bound to respect.”290 
But Taney’s opinion went even further than the dicta in Pollard in 
sharply limiting the power of Congress under the Property Clause. That 
Clause in fact applied, Taney wrote, only to land over which the United 
States had jurisdiction in 1787. Thus it did not apply to any landsfrom 
Florida to the Pacific Coastthat lay outside the boundaries of the 
United States, as they existed at the conclusion of the Revolutionary 
War: 
[T]he power there given [in the Property Clause], whatever it may be, 
is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory which at 
that time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States, and was 
within their boundaries as settled by the treaty  with Great Britain, 
and can have no influence upon a territory afterwards acquired from a 
foreign Government. It was a special provision for a known and 
particular territory, and  to meet a present emergency, and nothing 
more. . . . [It] has no reference whatever to any territory or other 
property which the new sovereignty might afterwards itself 
 acquire.”291 
Reminiscent of McKinley’s Pollard opinion, Taney’s discussion of 
the Property Clause consisted of many pages292 of what historian Don 
Fehrenbacher, in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book on the case, called 
“rambling, repetitious prose” offering a “bizarre explication” that was 
“difficult to take . . . seriously.”293 The Court had never before, and has 
never after, viewed the Property Clause as applying only to property the 
U.S. owned in 1787. Like McKinley in Pollard, Taney in Dred Scott 
utterly ignored the Court’s earlier unanimous decision in Gratiot, in 
which Taney had participated. While Taney did not cite Pollard, 
concurring Justice John Campbell of Alabama, who had taken 
McKinley’s seat on the Court in 1853, did, to bolster his argument that 
Congress had no power to enact the Missouri Compromise.294 
 
years before. The Dred Scott Court had a full complement of nine Justices, including four 
northerners, two of whomMcLean of Ohio and Curtis of Massachusettsdissented. McLean had 
joined the majority in Pollard, but Curtis was not yet on the Court. Nelson of New York and Grier of 
Pennsylvania, neither of whom were on the Court when Pollard was decided, wrote concurring 
opinions in Dred Scott.  
 290. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407; see FEHRENBACHER, supra note 251.  
 291. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 432, 436. 
 292. Id. at 432–45. 
 293. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 251, at 367.  
 294. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 508–09. Campbell would resign his seat in early 1861 to become 
Assistant Secretary of War for the Confederate States of America. 
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Taney’s sharp limit on Congress’s power under the Property Clause 
not only meant the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, it had 
potentially huge implications for public land policy in general, 
comparable to those posed by McKinley’s dicta in Pollard. It called into 
question hundreds of statutes establishing public land policy in the vast 
regions the nation had acquired since 1787, and hundreds of thousands, 
if not millions, of land transactions that were based upon them. Surely 
Taney appreciated those implications, having served as Andrew 
Jackson’s Attorney General and then Treasury Secretary, where he had 
supervisory authority over the General Land Office, which administered 
the public lands. 
In his dissent in Dred Scott, Justice John McLean, who had earlier 
served as the Commissioner of the General Land Office, underscored 
the importance of recognizing settled congressional authority over the 
public lands and the western territories.295 Without it, he wrote, 
settlement and expansion through the formation of “flourishing States, 
West and South,” would not have happened.296 He called it most unwise 
to abandon “a settled construction of the Constitution for sixty years,” 
an “impressive lesson of practical wisdom” which had “secured to the 
country an advancement and prosperity beyond the power of 
computation.”297 “If the great and fundamental principles of our 
Government are never to be settled,” he warned, “there can be no 
lasting prosperity,” and the Constitution will “become a floating waif on 
the billows of popular excitement.”298 
The consequences of the Dred Scott decision were hardly 
theoretical. The slave states could collectively block any amendments to 
the Constitution that might repair the damage. Its view of the Property 
Clause spelled doom for the idea that the nation’s public lands could be 
a tool for peaceably ending the nation’s cleavage over slavery through 
the political process. By reading into the Constitution the idea that 
African-Americans could have no rights, and that the Property Clause 
gave Congress no authority to address slavery in territories acquired 
since the Constitution was adopted, the Court’s decision made sectional 
civil war nearly inevitable. 
The Supreme Court has never formally overruled Dred Scott. The 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the 
Constitutionthe so-called Civil War Amendmentsoverruled Taney’s 
view of the status of African-Americans. But these amendments did not 
affect Dred Scott’s holding that the Property Clause had a limited 
geographic scope. 
 
 295. Id. at 529. 
 296. Id. at 544. 
 297. Id.  
 298. Id. at 544–45.  
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Interestingly, while the Utah Paper relies heavily on Pollard, it fails 
to mention Dred Scott, even though that decision is the strongest 
authority for its position. The omission is made more curious by the fact 
that one of the Paper’s authors299 had some years earlier tendered an 
amicus brief relying heavily on Dred Scott in support of a petition for 
Supreme Court review filed by a Nevada rancher who was arguing, 
among other things, that the U.S. had no constitutional authority over 
public lands.300 
The reason the Utah Paper ignores Dred Scott is probably because 
it is the most thoroughly discredited decision in Supreme Court history, 
earning practically universal condemnation among historians and 
constitutional scholars.301 Professor Akhil Reed Amar succinctly 
summarized the consensus critique: Taney’s opinion “did violence to 
the Constitution’s text, structure, enactment history, and early 
implementation.”302 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton, a defender of slavery but an ardent 
unionist,303 wrote a book about the Dred Scott decision a few months 
after it was decided. He criticized the Court for putting itself squarely in 
conflict with the “uniform action of all the departments of the Federal 
government from its foundation to the present time.”304 That 
positioning, Benton wrote, cannot be accepted without “reversing that 
action, and admitting the political supremacy of the court, and 
accepting an altered Constitution from its hands and taking a new and 
portentous point of departure in the working of the government.”305 
Much the same could be said about the effect of accepting the 
arguments of the Utah Paper and those taking similar positions. 
The Dred Scott decision fully deserves its infamy. It ushered in 
human carnage on American soil never seen before or since. 
Meanwhile, like hundreds of thousands of Americans whose lives would 
be ended prematurely, and like Roger Brooke Taney himselfwho died 
 
 299. John W. Howard, see HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at i.  
 300. United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997). 
Nearly a half-century earlier, Taney’s decision was also cited without apology by a Texas law 
professor for the proposition that states own submerged public lands off the nation’s coasts. 
Patterson, supra note 1, at 55, n.26, n.28.  
 301. But see MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006). 
 302. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY, 265 (2005). 
 303. Benton’s stance against secession later earned him a chapter in John F. Kennedy’s Pulitzer 
Prize-winning book PROFILES IN COURAGE (1955). 
 304. T.H. BENTON, HISTORICAL AND LEGAL EXAMINATION OF THAT PART OF THE DECISION OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DRED SCOTT CASE, WHICH DECLARES THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE ACT, AND THE SELF-EXTENSION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION TO TERRITORIES, CARRYING SLAVERY ALONG WITH IT (1857), quoted in Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 276 (1900).  
 305. Id.; see also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 251, at 425–26, 686.  
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in late 1864,306 on the same day his home state of Maryland abolished 
slaveryDred Scott’s view of the Property Clause, like Justice 
McKinley’s sweeping dicta in Pollard, would not survive the Civil War. 
The Supreme Court has almost never mentioned Dred Scott’s view 
of the Property Clause since it was decided. A rare exception came in 
1900, when the Court took pains to be gentle in dismissing it. It was 
“unfortunate,” said Justice Henry Brown, writing for the Court in 
Downes v. Bidwell,307 that Justice Taney addressed the Property Clause 
issue in Dred Scott “in view of the excited political condition of the 
country at the time.” 308 Brown rejected the idea that Taney’s view of the 
Property Clause should control the question before the Courtthe 
source and extent of Congress’s power over the Territory of Puerto Rico. 
In considerable understatement, Brown found it simply “sufficient to 
say that the country did not acquiesce in [Taney’s] opinion,” because 
the Civil War that followed “produced such changes in judicial, as well 
as public, sentiment as to seriously impair” its authority.309 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF CONGRESS’S POWER OVER 
PUBLIC LANDS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
With peace restored, the Supreme Court did not take long to 
restore its pre-Pollard, highly deferential view of Congress’s power over 
public lands. The course was firmly set in three unanimous decisions 
handed down over a five-year period, each written by Justice Stephen J. 
Field.310 
In Grisar v. McDowell (1867),311 the Court noted with approval that 
“from an early period in the history of the government it has been the 
practice of the President to order, from time to time, as the exigencies 
 
 306. A few months after Taney’s death, speaking on a bill to appropriate funds to prepare and 
display a bust of Taney with those of his predecessors in the Supreme Court, Senator Charles Sumner 
of Massachusetts called his Dred Scott opinion “more thoroughly abominable than anything of the 
kind in the history of courts,” where judicial “baseness reached its lowest point,” “sustained by a 
falsification of history.” FEHRENBACHER, supra note 251, at 578–79. 
 307. Downes, 182 U.S. at 274. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Justice Field was appointed to the Supreme Court by Abraham Lincoln in 1863. Originally 
from the east, he had joined the Gold Rush to California in 1848 and served on the California 
Supreme Court for six years, four as Chief Justice, before joining the U.S. Supreme Court. CARL 
BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW, 25–118 (1930). Field later wrote the most 
searching exploration of the Constitution’s Enclave Clause. Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 
U.S. 524 (1885), discussed in the text accompanying note 81–90 supra.  
 311. 73 U.S. 363 (1867). Field’s opinion did not mention the Property Clause. It upheld President 
Fillmore’s reservation of public lands in San Francisco from sale two months after California became 
a state, in order to set them apart for unspecified “public uses.” It rejected a claim to the land by a 
person who relied on the City’s inchoate “pueblo right,” said to derive from Mexican law that had 
applied at the time the U.S. acquired the area which became California. Grisar’s rejection of the claim 
seemed to contradict the Court’s 1836 decision in Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, which 
upheld a municipal claim to land based on Spanish law. See supra text accompanying note 247.  
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of the public service required, parcels of land belonging to the United 
States to be reserved from sale and set apart for public uses.”312 
In Gibson v. Chouteau (1871),313 the Court held that a state law statute 
of limitations did not apply to a dispute between competing claimants 
to public land in Missouri, because the Property Clause vests 
Congress with a power over public lands that is “subject to no 
limitations,” giving it the “absolute right” to decide when and under 
what conditions to transfer the property to others, and states cannot 
“interfere with this right or embarrass its exercise.”314 
In The Yosemite Valley Case, Hutchings v. Low (1872),315 the Court 
narrowly interpreted statutes authorizing divestiture of public lands 
in order to “preserve[] a wise control in the government over the 
public lands, and prevent[] a general spoliation of them under the 
pretense [sic] of intended settlement and pre-emption.” Otherwise, 
Justice Field wrote, Congress would be deprived “of the power to 
reserve such lands” for such “public uses” as “arsenals, fortifications, 
lighthouses, hospitals, custom-houses, court-houses, or for any other 
of the numerous public purposes for which property is used by the 
government.” The public purpose the government was seeking to 
serve in that case was permanently protecting for public enjoyment, 
through strict limitations imposed by federal law, astoundingly scenic 
lands the Congress granted to the state of California.316 
In hindsight, these decisions reaffirming Congress’s broad powers 
over public lands were practically inevitable. The Civil War had changed 
forever the attitude of the American people about national power in 
relation to states. Even with slavery now formally outlawed by 
constitutional amendment, it would have been untenable for the Court 
to take seriously McKinley’s sweeping dicta in Pollard, and Taney’s 
constricted view of the Property Clause in Dred Scott. To do so would 
have been tantamount to insisting to Congress that, if it wanted to 
admit a new state into the Union, it would necessarily be relinquishing 
all control over all public lands in that state. To say Congress would 
have had difficulty accepting this is to understate the matter. After Dred 
Scott and the Civil War, the Court’s stature in the governing system was 
at a low ebb, and the representatives of the people in the states had 
more reason than ever to appreciate the “blood and treasure” they had 
expended to secure those lands for the Union. 
Justice Field did not mention Dred Scott in any of these three 
decisions. His deference to Congress in these public lands cases is in 
sharp contrast to his general reluctance to defer to legislative authority, 
 
 312. 73 U.S. at 381. 
 313. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92 (1871). 
 314. Id. at 99. 
 315. 82 U.S. 77 (1872). This decision did not mention the Property Clause.  
 316. Id. at 86. 
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and his championing of economic liberty, which helped pave the way for 
the era of “substantive due process” in U.S. constitutional law.317 
Ever since these decisions, the Supreme Court has uniformly 
adhered to Gratiot and the idea that the U.S. Government has sweeping 
authority over its public lands. The following is a sampling of those 
decisions. Some do not directly address the Property Clause, but are 
included because they reveal the consistency with which the Court both 
understood, and approved of, the policies of the Congress to acquire 
and reserve large amounts of public land in national ownership for such 
broad purposes as preserving scenery, wildlife, features of historic or 
scientific interest, and other things that can be lumped under the 
general heading of environmental conservation. Taken as a whole, they 
illustrate just how thoroughly Congress’s power to hold public lands 
inside states for broad public uses is woven into the fabric of American 
law, just as those lands themselves are now thoroughly woven into 
American culture. 
— Kohl v. United States (1875) (unanimous)318 (the U.S. government 
has authority “to appropriate lands or other property within the states 
for its own use, to enable it to perform its proper functions,” because 
such authority “is essential to its independent existence and 
perpetuity,” and states cannot interfere with its exercise).319 
—Van Brocklin v. Tennessee (1886) (unanimous)320 (lands owned by 
the U.S. inside the state of Tennessee are not subject to state taxation, 
because the U.S. “has the exclusive right to control and dispose of” 
public lands and “no [s]tate can interfere with this right, or embarrass 
its exercise”) (citing, among others, Gratiot, Pollard, and Gibson v. 
Choteau).321 
—United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co. (1896) (unanimous)322 
(U.S. has authority to acquire, from unwilling sellers, private lands 
inside a state for preservation and public instruction. The 
 
 317. See e.g., SWISHER, supra note 310, at 426–27 (1930); PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: 
SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO T 164, 266 (1997).  
 318. 91 U.S. 367 (1875). Only Justice Field dissented, solely on the ground that, in his view, 
Congress had not enacted the legislation he thought needed to exercise the authority. See id. 378–79. 
 319. Id. at 368. 
 320. 117 U.S. 151 (1886).  
 321. Id. at 168. 
 322. 160 U.S. 668 (1896). Four years earlier, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 297 
(1893), the Court noted that at one time, “in the memory of [living persons],” the idea that 
government could acquire private property for a public park, over the objection of its owner, would 
have been regarded as a “novel exercise of legislative power.” But now, the Court observed, 
practically all cities around the country had such parks, “for exclusive use as a pleasure-ground, for 
rest and exercise in the open air,” and state courts had rejected constitutional challenges to the 
government acquiring private property for such a use, deeming it “advantageous to the public for 
recreation, health, or business.” Id. at 297. The Court went on to uphold an 1890 act of Congress 
authorizing the U.S. to acquire private property in the District of Columbia in order to establish Rock 
Creek Park. Id. at 322. Gettysburg essentially reached the same result regarding acquisition of 
private land outside the District of Columbia, within the state of Pennsylvania. See Gettysburg, 160 
U.S. at 669, 686. 
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Pennsylvania lands were the site of the pivotal Civil War Battle of 
Gettysburg, and the Court noted that for the U.S. to “take possession 
of the field of battle in the name and for the benefit of all the citizens 
of the country for the present and for the future” would “show a 
proper recognition of the great things that were done there,” and 
enhance every citizen’s “love and respect for those institutions;” 
therefore the government’s authority “to condemn for this purpose 
need not be plainly and unmistakably” linked to any particular 
constitutional power).323 
—Camfield v. United States (1897) (unanimous)324 (U.S. can prohibit 
enclosures of its public lands, including outlawing fences that in fact 
enclose those lands even though they are located entirely on adjacent 
private lands, because the admission of a State does not deprive 
Congress of “the power of legislating for the protection of the public 
lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily 
known as the police power”).325 
—Light v. United States (1911) (unanimous)326 (rejecting the 
argument that “Congress cannot constitutionally withdraw large 
bodies of land from settlement without the consent of the State where 
it is located,” because the U.S. can “prohibit absolutely or fix the 
terms on which its property may be used. As it can withhold or 
reserve the land it can do so indefinitely”).327 
—Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States (1917) (unanimous)328 
(“the settled course of legislation, congressional and state, and 
repeated decisions of this court have gone upon the theory that the 
power of Congress [under the Property Clause] is exclusive[.] . . . 
From the earliest times Congress by its legislation, applicable alike in 
the States and Territories, has regulated in many particulars the use 
by others of the lands of the United States[.] . . . The States and the 
public have almost uniformly accepted this legislation as controlling, 
and in the instances where it has been questioned in this court its 
validity has been upheld and its supremacy over state enactments 
sustained”).329 
 
 323. Gettysburg, 160 U.S. at 682–83. 
 324. 167 U.S. 518 (1897). 
 325. Id. at 525–26. 
 326. 220 U.S. 523 (1911). HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 97, unpersuasively asserts that the 
“fundamental legitimacy of federal [land] ownership was neither joined nor decided in Light.” 
 327. Light, 220 U.S. at 535–36. 
 328. 243 U.S. 389 (1917). The Court’s opinion was written by Willis Van Devanter. His 
endorsement of the position that Congress had sweeping authority over public lands contrasts with 
his constricted view of other constitutional powers of Congress. Toward the end of his judicial career, 
he would vote to strike down key pieces of New Deal legislation, leading Franklin Roosevelt to 
propose his “court-packing” plan. See, e.g., JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. 
THE SUPREME COURT 2–3 (2010). Before he was appointed to the Court by President Taft in 1910, 
Van Devanter had lived in Wyoming and then served as the Assistant U.S. Attorney General for the 
Interior Department. In Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336–37 (1963), Justice 
Douglas’s opinion for the Court noted that “as Assistant Attorney General for the Interior 
Department from 1897 to 1903, [Van Devanter] did more than any other person to give character 
and distinction to the administration of the public lands.”  
 329. 243 U.S. at 404–05. 
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—McKelvey v. United States (1922) (unanimous)330 (“It is firmly 
settled that Congress may prescribe rules respecting the use of the 
public lands. It may sanction some uses and prohibit others, and may 
forbid interference with such as are sanctioned.”).331 
—Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth. (1936)332 (the Property 
Clause’s grant of power to Congress is “made in broad terms,” so that 
“it lies in the discretion of the Congress, acting in the public interest, 
to determine of how much of [its] property it shall dispose.” The 
Court cited decisions back to and including Gratiot, and dismissed 
Pollard v. Hagan as dealing only with “the title of the States to 
tidelands and the soil under navigable waters within their 
borders.”).333 
—United States v. San Francisco (1940)334 (“Congress may 
constitutionally limit the disposition of the public domain to a 
manner consistent with its view of public policy,” and has “complete 
power” over “public property entrusted to it.” The Court also cited 
Gratiot for the proposition that Congress’s Property Clause power is 
“without limitations,” and made no reference to Pollard.).335 
—United States v. Wyoming (1947) (unanimous)336 (noting the 
“necessity” for Congress to reserve “tracts of public lands to 
accomplish such important purposes as preserving the national 
forests . . . establishing public parks, and the like,” and finding the 
United States “not inhibited from making such reservations and 
dispositions” of public lands “as required by the public interest and as 
authorized by applicable statutes”).337 
—Arizona v. California (1963)338 (rejecting the argument, based 
“largely upon statements in [Pollard],” that the United States has no 
power, after Arizona became a state, to “reserve waters for the use and 
benefit of” public lands in the State, because Pollard involved “only 
the shores of and lands beneath navigable waters,” and “cannot be 
accepted as limiting the broad powers of the United States to regulate 
government . . . lands” under the Property Clause, a matter upon 
which the Court emphatically expressed “no doubt.”).339 
—Kleppe v. New Mexico (1976) (unanimous)340 (holding that while 
the “furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause 
have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed” 
 
 330. 260 U.S. 353 (1922). Justice Van Devanter wrote this opinion as well. 
 331. Id. at 359. 
 332. 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Only Justice McReynolds dissented. Id. at 356–71. In a separate 
opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Brandeis wrote that he would not have reached the 
constitutional issue because he thought the case could have been resolved without doing so, but also 
noted that he had no dispute with the Court’s “conclusion on the constitutional question.” Id. at 341.  
 333. Id. at 336–37. 
 334. 310 U.S. 16 (1940). Again Justice McReynolds was the sole dissenter, without opinion. Id. at 32. 
 335. Id. at 29–30. 
 336. 331 U.S. 440 (1947). 
 337. Id. at 453–54. 
 338. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). There were no dissents from this part of the Court’s opinion. See id. at 
627–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting on other grounds). 
 339. Id. at 597–98. 
 340. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). 
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that the power “thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations,” 
citing Gratiot several times, and making no reference to Pollard).341 
—United States v. Locke (1985)342 (in upholding Congress’s power to 
forfeit property interests in the public lands that have not been 
properly recorded, the Court noted that the U.S., “as owner of the 
underlying fee title to the public domain, maintains broad powers 
over the terms and conditions upon which the public lands can be 
used, leased, and acquired.”).343 
—The Court has also many times followed what it has called “the 
established rule” that grants of public lands “are construed favorably 
to the Government, that nothing passes except what is conveyed in 
clear language, and that if there are doubts they are resolved for the 
Government, not against it.”344 While most of the cases applying this 
canon have rejected claims by private parties, at least one decision 
applied the canon against a state agency.345 
A. SUMMARY CONCLUSION ON THE PROPERTY CLAUSE 
Given the Court’s numerous, consistent decisions upholding 
Congress’s broad power over public lands stretching back a century and 
a half, the Utah Paper correctly concedes that the Property Clause is 
“likely” the U.S.’s “most powerful argument.”346 It fails even to mention 
most of these decisions, and says little about those it does address, 
except to contend, lamely, that they do not answer the question 
“whether the public lands belong to the United States or should 
properly have transferred to State ownership on admission to the 
Union.”347 
That is a brave assertion, but it is practically unimaginable that the 
Supreme Courtor indeed any one of its Justices, no matter how 
skeptically he or she might regard other assertions of national 
powercould be persuaded to reject the plain language and 
unmistakable thrust of all these decisions, by accepting the Utah 
Paper’s contention that the question is still open whether Congress has 
the constitutional power to own public lands inside a state indefinitely. 
While Kleppe and some of these other decisions speak of 
Congress’s Property Clause power as “without limitations,” no one 
would deny that the Constitution’s other specific limitations on 
Congress’s power would apply. For example, Congress could not use its 
 
 341. Id. at 539–41. 
 342. 471 U.S. 84 (1985). 
 343. Id. at 104. 
 344. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957). See generally John D. Leshy, 
A Property Clause for the Twenty-First Century, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1102, 1106–13 (2004) 
(discussing cases displaying the “remarkable lengths” to which the Court has construed grants of 
land by the United States in its favor).  
 345. See United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 235–36 (1960). 
 346. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 113. 
 347. Id. at 98.  
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Property Clause power to prohibit political speechmaking on public 
lands, for that would violate the specific command of the First 
Amendment.348 That is, however, a constitutional matter very different 
from limiting Congress’s power over public lands on the basis of 
judicially-fashioned notions of “equal footing” or “equal sovereignty” 
that do not appear in the Constitution.349 
B. POLLARD’S VIABILITY SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 
For the most part, Pollard’s narrow holdingthat states 
automatically, at statehood, succeed to ownership of a narrow class of 
lands within their borders; namely, certain submerged landshas 
survived. 
The courts have clarified some of McKinley’s language in Pollard; 
for example, he several times referred to the “shores” of navigable 
waters, without elaboration,350 but ever since, Pollard has been 
construed as not applying to land along the shores above the highwater 
mark.351 McKinley’s opinion mostly spoke of lands under “navigable 
waters,” but also noted evidence showing that the land there at issue 
was covered by water “at high tide.”352 Since the Civil War, the Court 
has made clear that Pollard applies both to lands under navigable 
waters, even if the waters are not tidally influenced,353 and to lands 
under waters that are tidally influenced, even if not navigable.354 
But the Court has, on several occasions, ignored McKinley’s 
sweeping statements to the effect that, because ownership of the beds of 
navigable waters is essential to a state’s sovereignty, the U.S. only holds 
those lands temporarily in trust for new states, and cannot transfer title 
to those submerged lands to others while the land is in territorial 
status.355 These decisions show, in other words, that many of 
McKinley’s sweeping statements, purporting to be of constitutional 
principle leading to the result he reached, are not, in fact, a 
constitutional doctrine at all. In 1894, for example, the Supreme Court 
explained that, “[n]otwithstanding the dicta contained in some of the 
opinions of this court . . . to the effect that Congress has no power to 
grant any land below high water mark of navigable waters in a Territory 
of the United States [that is, before statehood], it is evident that this is 
not strictly true.”356 Indeed, the Court has long acknowledged that the 
 
 348. See Appel, supra note 12.  
 349. See infra text accompanying notes 413–474. 
 350. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 225, 230 (1845).  
 351. See, e.g., PPL Mont. LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 589–91 (2012). 
 352. See Pollard, 44 U.S. at 220–21, 229–30.  
 353. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1877).  
 354. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988). 
 355. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 230. See supra text accompanying notes 230–232.  
 356. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47–48 (1894).  
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U.S. can defeat a new state’s Pollard-rooted claim of ownership of the 
beds of navigable waters, simply by conveying ownership of them to 
third parties before statehood.357 This is, as Professor Rasband has 
pointed out, inconsistent with the rationale McKinley put forth in 
Pollard.358 
Other Supreme Court decisions have narrowed Pollard’s narrow 
holding even further; to wit: 
—The Court has for more than a century held that Pollard does not 
apply to islands or other “fast lands” surrounded by submerged lands 
to which Pollard applies.359 
—The Court has held that Pollard does not apply to lands that accrete 
or attach to submerged lands, because of the “long-established” rule 
of federal common law that accretions of land belong to the owner of 
the uplands.360 
—The Court has held that the U.S can defeat a state’s claim of 
ownership of the beds of navigable waters by reserving them for its 
own uses before statehood, if it does so clearly.361 As Professor 
Rasband has pointed out, the Court’s adoption of the idea that the 
U.S. intention be made plain reflects the English common law rule 
that the U.S. Supreme Court misconstrued in Martin v. Waddell.362 
—The Court has several times confirmed that Pollard does not apply 
to the beds of non-navigable waters on the public lands, which 
remain in U.S. ownership after statehood. Ironically, the leading case 
on this point involved submerged lands that comprise much of the 
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon, the scene in early 2016 
of an armed takeover by a private group of radicals who claimed there 
was no constitutional basis for the U.S. to own it.363 
—In a series of cases, the Court has held that Pollard does not give 
coastal states ownership of submerged lands off their coasts.364 In its 
brief in the first of these cases, the U.S. Justice Department refused to 
endorse Pollard’s narrow holding, describing as “unsound” the 
“concept of ownership as an attribute of sovereignty” and governed by 
notions of equal footing.365 In ruling for the United States, the Court 
 
 357. See, e.g., Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U.S. 471, 478 (1850).  
 358. See Rasband, supra note 45, at 54–57.  
 359. See, e.g., Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 244–45 (1913); Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702,  
713–14 (1973). State ownership may extend to tiny islands in navigable waters that are “little more 
than rocks rising very slightly above the level of the water” and which are “of no apparent value.” 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 209 U.S. 447, 451 (1908). 
 360. California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 285–86 (1982). 
 361. See, e.g., Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 200–03 (1987); United 
States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 33–60 (1997); Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 78–79 (2005).  
 362. See Rasband, supra note 45, at 55–57. 
 363. See, e.g., United States. v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935). 
 364. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 36–38 (1947).  
 365. See Hanna, supra note 45, at 521 n.5 (citing Brief for the United States, at 143); see also 
California, 332 U.S. at 30–31; Landever, supra note 3, at 592 n.223, 593–94 n.232.  
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noted the Justice Department’s position without specifically 
addressing it.366 
—The Court has held that, where a state (or the state’s successor in 
title) owns submerged lands, the “navigational servitude” grounded in 
national power over navigation means that, in many circumstances, 
the U.S. has no duty to compensate the owner of submerged lands for 
impairing or even destroying its property interest.367 For example, the 
Court has held that the “power of the federal Government in respect 
of navigation” is so “dominant” that if its exercise injures the 
streambed the owner cannot obtain compensation because the injury 
is deemed to result from “the lawful exercise of a power to which that 
property has always been subject.”368 
The net result of all these decisions is thatdespite Justice 
McKinley’s sweeping assertion that the U.S. may own lands only for the 
“temporary purposes” of raising revenue and admitting new 
stateseven Pollard’s narrow holding has been greatly eroded. It is 
now, as the Supreme Court has made clear, merely a “default rule” 
giving states the presumption of title to submerged lands under waters 
that are navigable at statehood.369 That presumption can be defeated if 
the U.S. has earlier conveyed ownership of such submerged lands to 
others. It can also be defeated if the U.S. had kept those submerged 
lands for its own purposes by actions revealing an intent to defeat a 
state’s expectancy of ownership.370  
In sum, even Pollard’s narrow holdingthough masquerading as 
an impregnable constitutional principle, helped along by McKinley’s 
sweeping dictahas been treated merely like a common law 
presumption which can be overcome by either the executive or the 
legislative branches of the national government without invading any 
rights a state may claim. 
IV.  THE UTAH PAPER’S “COMPACT THEORY” 
The Utah Paper argues that the state and the U.S. government 
entered into a “compact” when the U.S. admitted Utah into the Union. 
In this “compact,” according to the Utah Paper, “Utah agreed to allow” 
the U.S. to retain ownership of land within its borders, and in return the 
U.S. “agreed to promptly and completely dispose of that land by sale or 
grant.”371 The Paper does not argue that the commitment was express; 
instead, it finds it “[i]mplicit” in the Utah Enabling Act.372 
 
 366. See infra text accompanying notes 431–442.  
 367. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 35.02(c) (1.01) (Amy K. Kelley, ed., 3rd ed. 2017). 
 368. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 592,  
596–97 (1941); see also United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231–32 (1960).  
 369. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272–73 (2001). 
 370. Id. at 273. 
 371. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 52–53. The Supreme Court has made it clear that, while a 
statehood enabling act and the counterpart provisions in a state constitution are, “in form at least,” a 
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Nothing in the circumstances of Utah’s admission supports this 
claim. It is true that the 1894 Utah Enabling Act, like that of most other 
states, proposed to admit the new state on an “equal footing with the 
original states.”373 But section 3 of the Enabling Act, like those of almost 
all the states that were admitted to the Union after the original thirteen, 
also required the people of Utah to “forever disclaim all right and title 
to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries 
thereof,” and to agree that those lands “shall be and remain subject to 
the disposition of the United States.”374 It also provided that the state 
“shall not be entitled to any further or other grants of land for any 
purpose than as expressly provided in this Act.”375 
In the Utah Enabling Act, the United States also offered to make 
generous grants of public land to the new state. These included giving 
the state four sections of public land in every township, or about  
one-ninth of the total area of the state, to support the common 
schools.376 Earlier-admitted states received only one or two sections in 
every township for this purpose.377 The Enabling Act also gave the state 
of Utah more than a million acres of public land for an assortment of 
purposes,378 including 500,000 acres for the “establishment of 
permanent water reservoirs for irrigating purposes.”379 Congress had 
never before provided a new state with such a grant.380 
But the Enabling Act also excluded any public lands “embraced in 
permanent reservations for national purposes,” and went on to exclude 
all other public lands “embraced in Indian, military, or other 
reservations of any character,” until such “reservations” are 
“extinguished” and the lands made available for divestiture.381 
Eighteen months after the Enabling Act was enacted, President 
Cleveland proclaimed the admission of Utah “into the Union on an 
equal footing with the original States.” But he did so only after declaring 
that the “terms and conditions prescribed by the Congress” for the state 
to qualify for admission “have been duly complied with,” including that 
the State had adopted an “ordinance irrevocable without the consent of 
 
compact between the United States and the new state, to the extent the compact deals with lands, it 
“involves no question of equality of status.” Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244–45 (1900); see 
also text accompanying notes 423–430 infra. 
 372. Id. at 3. 
 373. Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107 (1894).  
 374. Id. at 108 (emphasis added). 
 375. Id. at 110 (emphasis added). 
 376. § 6, 28 Stat. at 109. 
 377. See GATES, supra note 16, at 314. 
 378. §§ 7–8, 12, 28 Stat. at 109–10. 
 379. §	12, 28 Stat. at 110.  
 380. See GATES, supra note 16, at 314; see also Lawton, supra note 12, at 27–28. 
 381. 28 Stat. at 109 (emphasis added). 
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the United States,” that made the “various stipulations” recited in the 
Enabling Act.382 
When measured against all this explicit language reserving full 
authority in the U.S. over the public lands it was retaining in the new 
state, the Utah Paper’s argument that the U.S. nevertheless was making, 
at the same time, an implicit commitment to divest itself of ownership 
of all those retained public lands is, in a word, far-fetched. 
Professor Kochan puts forward a variation of the Utah Paper’s 
argument. He maintains that the statehood arrangement actually 
involved Utah in effect agreeing to convey clear title to public lands to 
the United States, and the United States in return accepting “a duty to 
dispose of the public lands” it thus “acquired” through the Utah 
Enabling Act and the state’s disclaimer.383 He cites nothing in the 
circumstances of Utah’s admission, or of the admission of any other 
state before or afterward, that supports this interpretation, for none 
exists. Utah had no claim, credible or otherwise, to public lands prior to 
or at statehood.384 
Starting from this wrong-headed assumption that Utah was 
somehow conveying public land to the United States as part of the 
statehood arrangement, Professor Kochan interprets language in the 
Enabling Act as indicating the U.S. was assuming the obligation to 
divest itself of ownership of all public lands in the new state’s borders. 
But he misreads the key section, § 3: 
That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare 
that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated 
public lands lying within the boundaries thereof; and to all lands lying 
within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and 
that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United 
States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the 
United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute 
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.385 
Professor Kochan focuses on the italicized words to suggest the 
United States was anticipating that it would not hold onto title to public 
lands forever. The same language appears in section 6 of the Enabling 
Act, which provides that the state cannot be credited with public lands 
“embraced in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character . . . 
until the reservation shall have been extinguished and such lands be 
restored to and become a part of the public domain.”386 
 
 382. Proclamation No. 9, 29 Stat. 876–77 (1895). 
 383. Kochan, supra note 3, at 1146, 1151. 
 384. The exception that proves this as a rule is Texas. As noted earlier, Texas was an independent 
republic when it joined the Union, and its annexation by the U.S. acknowledged that it retained title 
to public lands within its borders. See supra text accompanying notes 108–109. 
 385. 28 Stat. at 108 (emphasis added).  
 386. 28 Stat. at 109 (emphasis added). 
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The most natural reading of “shall have been” is as a conditional 
statement of what might happen in the future. Reading it instead to 
create a legal obligation on the part of the United States, as Professor 
Kochan does, is inconsistent with other parts of the Enabling Act, with 
its setting, and indeed, as discussed earlier, with almost the entire 
history of the statehood admission process dating back to the founding 
of the nation.387 
Professor Kochan similarly misinterprets language in section 9 of 
the Enabling Act, which gives the new state five percent “of the proceeds 
of the sales of public lands lying within said State, which shall be sold by 
the United States subsequent to the admission of said State into the 
Union . . .”388 He argues that this “mandatory language removes from 
the federal government the choice to never dispose and instead retain” 
unappropriated public lands.389 
Once again he packs much more freight on the word “shall” than it 
can bear in this context. Its most natural reading is again merely stating 
what might happen in the future, rather than legally committing the 
U.S. government to sell all the public lands it owns in the state. It was 
perfectly understandable that the drafters of the Enabling Act would 
want to make clear that the United States was not obliged to pay the 
new state of Utah five percent of the proceeds of sales of public lands 
within its borders that had preceded Utah’s entry into the Union. Thus, 
they took pains to limit the U.S. revenue-sharing obligation to public 
lands “which shall be sold . . . subsequent to the admission” of Utah.390 
That this is the correct reading is shown by the fact that identical 
language appears in the Nevada Enabling Act. While it was being 
considered in the Congress in 1864, a proposal that would have applied 
the revenue-sharing to past as well as future sales of public lands was 
defeated.391 
Professor Kochan tries to bolster his argument that everyone 
involved believed the U.S. was committing itself in the Enabling Act to 
divest itself of ownership of the public lands by referring to a resolution 
adopted by the Utah State Senate nearly twenty years after statehood, a 
resolution “exclaiming,” as he put it, Utah’s “understanding that the 
federal government had made a promise to dispose of the public lands it 
acquired when Utah became a state.”392 The language he quotes from 
the resolution does no such thing. Indeed, it does not even urge the 
United States to divest itself of ownership of all or even much of the 
 
 387. See supra text accompanying notes 38–68, 129–186. 
 388. 28 Stat. at 110 (emphasis added).  
 389. Kochan, supra note 3, at 1157–58. 
 390. Nevada Enabling Act, ch. 36, 13 Stat. 30, 32 (1864).  
 391. Id.; Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1558 (1864); Gates, supra note 16, at 309; see also 
Barrett, supra note 12, at 781–82.  
 392. Kochan, supra note 3, at 1146. 
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lands it owns. It merely urges the U.S. to once again “return to the 
former liberal National attitude toward the public domain,” which it 
goes on to describe as a “policy that will afford an opportunity to settle 
our lands and make use of our resources on terms of equality with the 
older states.”393 
More fundamentally, Professor Kochan, like the authors of the 
Utah paper, is engaging in an extremely selective reading of Utah 
history. Almost from the moment Utah was admitted to the Union, in 
fact, its political leaders fully supported the federal policy of reserving 
increasing amounts of public lands within its borders in permanent 
federal ownership. This remained the mainstream view in Utah for 
generations after statehood. For example, the first forest reserve on 
Utah public lands was established by President Grover Cleveland within 
months of statehood, in early 1897, largely through, according to 
historian Elmo Richardson, “the personal efforts of [Utah] Governor 
Heber M. Wells.”394 Indeed, Wells took the extra step of facilitating the 
establishment of federal forest reserves by withdrawing state-owned 
lands enclosed by proposed federal reserves from purchase and 
settlement.395 
John Cutler, who succeeded Wells as governor, “continued the 
close connection between state and federal administrations, and 
sponsored legislation to preserve additional areas.”396 In April 1902, the 
general conference of the Mormon Church voted to “encourage the 
federal government to withdraw all the [public] lands in watersheds 
along the Wasatch Front for protection in National Forests.”397 Most of 
the forest reserves established in Utah during this period, according to 
historian Thomas G. Alexander, “resulted from local pressure to protect 
watersheds.”398 
Reed Smoot, a Republican who represented Utah in the U.S. 
Senate from 1903 to 1933, and who was also a high official in the 
Mormon Church, was an active supporter of President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s vigorous campaign to reserve many public lands in U.S. 
ownership more or less permanently.399 When Congress in 1907 
prohibited the President from establishing new forest reserves in six 
western states, Utah was conspicuously not among them.400 Smoot 
 
 393. Id. 
 394. ELMO R. RICHARDSON, THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATION: CRUSADES AND CONTROVERSIES  
1897–1913 12 (1962). 
 395. Id. at 40. 
 396. Id. at 41. 
 397. THOMAS G. ALEXANDER, UTAH: THE RIGHT PLACE 226 (2d ed. 2003) (Statehood Centennial 
Project of the Utah State Historical Society). 
 398. Id.  
 399. Id. at 302; see also RICHARDSON, supra note 394, at 12, 26.  
 400. Forest Service, ch. 2097, 34 Stat. 1269 (1907).  
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became a champion of the national parks, joining forces with John Muir 
in the unsuccessful campaign to stop the damming of the Hetch-Hetchy 
Valley in California’s Yosemite National Park, and becoming a primary 
sponsor of the National Park Organic Act that was adopted in 1916.401 
He later became a primary proponent of Zion and Bryce Canyon 
National Parks and Cedar Breaks National Monument in Utah, as well 
as other national parks across the country.402 As Smoot’s efforts 
illustrated, the “designation of national forests and parks” in this era 
had gained the “hearty approval of most Utahns,” according to 
Alexander.403 
Another telling episode in Utah history ignored by the Utah Paper 
and by Professor Kochan occurred some years later. In 1929, President 
Hoover wrote a letter to the governors of western states proposing a 
commission to reevaluate the nation’s policy regarding the arid public 
lands.404 Republican Representative Don Colton of Utah introduced a 
resolution to create such a body, explaining on the floor of the House 
that the lack of “supervision or control” on about 200 million acres of 
arid public lands has led to severe problems of overgrazing and erosion, 
with vegetation “being destroyed” and the grazing lands “being ruined,” 
all calling into question “the future of the livestock industry in the 
West.”405 Congress established the Commission in 1930, and in 1931 it 
recommended that title to all the public lands in the west believed to be 
useful primarily for livestock grazing should be offered to the states, 
with the U.S. retaining only the mineral rights.406 
Led by Utah Governor George Dern, the western states spurned the 
Committee’s suggestion, and Congress never seriously considered it.407 
Historian Louise Peffer wrote that the lack of support for the idea 
“clarified opinion” in support of national control and continuing 
ownership of these lands, removing perhaps the largest obstacle to 
bringing the arid public “grazing lands into the conservation program;” 
in effect, giving an “all-clear signal for the enactment of grazing-control 
legislation” that would be enacted within three years.408 
 
 401. Thomas G. Alexander, Senator Reed Smoot and Western Land Policy, 1905–1920, 13 ARIZ. 
& WEST 245, 247–53 (19710). 
 402. Alexander, supra note 397, at 302; Alexander, supra note 401.  
 403. Alexander, supra note 401; see also JOHN ISE, UNITED STATES FOREST POLICY, 294–95 (1923) 
(describing that Utah was generally more supportive of forest reserves than some other western 
states).  
 404. Louise Peffer, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND RESERVATION POLICIES 
1900–50 203 (1951). 
 405. 72 Cong. Rec. 342, 408 (1929); see also Peffer, supra note 404, at 203. 
 406. Peffer, supra note 404, at 204.  
 407. Id. at 205–13.  
 408. Id. at 213. The episode is also discussed in GATES, supra note 16, at 524–29. The adoption of 
the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 is discussed below. See infra at text accompanying notes 509–518. 
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Governor Dern explained the states’ reasoning to a congressional 
committee. The United States, he testified, had already granted the 
states “millions of acres of this same kind of land . . . which is yielding 
no income. Why should they want more of this precious heritage of 
desert?”409 In that same testimony, Governor Dern argued that if the 
ownership of the lands was to be transferred, the states ought to be able 
to take title to the minerals as well. He did not, however, claim that the 
states had a legal right to the minerals or the land surface, noting that it 
was “not the law” that the state had an “equal footing” claim to all the 
public lands.410 
Once the lack of interest in transferring arid lands to the states 
became obvious, Utah Representative Don Colton introduced a bill to 
provide mechanisms for the U.S. to manage livestock grazing and 
restore the health of these lands abused by overgrazing.411 Although he 
left Congress in 1932, his idea was picked up by Congressman Edward 
Taylor of Colorado, and President Roosevelt signed it into law in 
1934.412 
V.  “EQUAL FOOTING” AND “EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY” 
The Utah Paper argues that the Constitution contains, and invites 
the judiciary to enforce, a principle of “equal footing” or “equal 
sovereignty” among the states. Besides Pollard v. Hagan, it primarily 
relies on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Coyle v. Smith,413 and Shelby 
County v. Holder.414 The weaknesses of Pollard v. Hagan have been 
previously discussed at length,415 and, as noted earlier, the drafters of 
the U.S. Constitution excised an “equal footing” idea from the final draft 
of the provision authorizing Congress to admit new states.416 
The Court’s modern embrace, by a five-to-four margin, of the 
“equal sovereignty” idea in Shelby County has been controversial. 
Justice Ginsburg wrote a lengthy, critical dissent on the point.417 One 
scholar called the suggestion that the U.S. must treat states equally as a 
“chimera, without support in constitutional text, history, or 
precedent.”418 The eminent legal thinker Richard Posner was equally 
 
 409. Peffer, supra note 404, at 208. 
 410. Granting Remaining Unreserved Public Lands to the States: Hearings on H.R. 5840 Before 
the House Comm. on the Public Lands, 72d Cong. 1st Sess. 15 (1932). 
 411. See infra text accompanying notes 509–518. 
 412. Id. 
 413. 221 U.S. 559, 559 (1911); HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 58–59. 
 414. 570 U.S. 129 (2013), Shelby County was prefigured by Northwest Austin Municipal Util. 
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009). See HOWARD, supra note 4, at 60–61, 75.  
 415. See supra text accompanying notes 227–287. 
 416. See supra text accompanying notes 59–61.  
 417. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. 129 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 418. Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L.REV. 24, 
24 (2013); see also Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (2016).  
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dismissive, writing that “there is no doctrine of equal sovereignty. The 
opinion rests on air.”419 Posner’s assessment has been described as the 
“consensus critical reaction” to the decision.420 As Professor John 
Hanna put it nearly 70 years ago, while the idea can be found in the 
cession of the landed states and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 
“equal footing is not a constitutional expression,” and it is also “hard to 
find any other point of agreement about it.”421 
Whatever Shelby County and Coyle might mean in other contexts, 
it deserves emphasis that neither had anything to do with public lands. 
They applied a generalized notion of state political equality to insulate 
traditional state prerogatives from congressional interference in very 
narrow circumstances. Shelby County protected Alabama’s sovereign 
authority to enact and implement some kinds of state laws dealing with 
voting without first obtaining approval from the U.S. Attorney General 
or a three-judge court, as required by the federal Voting Rights Act. 
Coyle preserved Oklahoma’s power to fix the geographic location of its 
state capital, rejecting a limitation on that power which Congress had 
included in the state’s Enabling Act. Coyle has always been understood 
as having no implications for U.S. ownership of public lands within a 
state, and as creating no obstacle to enforcing conditions Congress put 
on a state’s admission to the Union that are authorized by the Property 
Clause or other parts of the Constitution.422 
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has enforced provisions in 
statehood enabling acts dealing with public lands in a number of cases. 
In its 1900 decision in Stearns v. Minnesota, for example, the Court 
distinguished between enabling act provisions that refer to “political 
rights and obligations,” and those that refer to “property.”423 
Forecasting its decision eleven years later in Coyle, it noted that the 
“full equality” with which a new state enters into the Union “may forbid 
any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying [that new state’s] 
political rights and obligations.” It went on to say, however, that “a 
mere agreement in reference to property involves no question of 
equality of status, but only of the power of a State to deal with the 
nation . . . in reference to such property.”424 
 
 419. Richard A. Posner, The Voting Rights Act Ruling Is About the Conservative Imagination, 
SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12L16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013/the_supreme_court_and_the_voting_ri
ghts_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html.  
 420. Thomas Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1090 
(2016).  
 421. Hanna, supra note 45, at 522–23.  
 422. See Julien C. Monnet, Violations by a State of the Conditions of Its Enabling Act, 10 COLUM. 
L. REV. 591, 596–97 (1910). 
 423. 179 U.S. 223, 244–46 (1900). 
 424. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In Stearns, the Court upheld provisions in Minnesota’s admission 
statute that gave public land to the state on the condition that it provide 
favorable tax treatment to a railroad operating on that land. Congress 
had independent power under the Property Clause, the Court reasoned, 
to attach that condition to a grant of public land.425 It was, therefore, 
irrelevant whether Congress was treating Minnesota differently from 
other states. In fact, as observed in the most comprehensive analysis of 
statehood enabling acts, the history of Congress’s use of conditions in 
those acts undermines the Supreme Court’s occasional suggestions that 
“equal footing” has some grounding in the Constitution.426 
More than a quarter of a century before Stearns v. Minnesota, the 
Court suggested that provisions in statehood enabling acts requiring 
new states to acknowledge U.S. ownership and control of public lands 
simply reinforce what is already the case under the Property Clause. In 
its 1871 decision in Gibson v. Choteau, for example, the Court noted 
that such disclaimers were put in enabling acts simply as a precaution, 
“to prevent the possibility of any attempted interference with” U.S. 
control of its public lands. The Property Clause, said the Court, gives 
Congress the “absolute right” to decide what to do with its property, 
regardless of what a state may want, and states cannot “interfere with 
this right or embarrass its exercise.”427 Coyle v. Smith428 reaffirmed this 
notion, acknowledging that Congress could put conditions on a state’s 
admission to the Union that “are within the scope of the conceded 
powers of Congress over the subject,”429 which includes Congress’s 
plenary authority under the Property Clause to retain ownership of 
public lands in a state after it is admitted. 
Other decisions by the Court also rest on the premise that Congress 
can exercise broad power over public lands in the statehood admission 
process. For example, several have enforced, long after statehood, 
restrictions Congress included in statehood enabling acts on a state’s 
use of lands the U.S. granted to it at statehood.430 The Utah Paper does 
not address any of these decisions. 
In a singular case that provoked a sharp dissent, the Court once did 
use an equal footing rationale to reject a state’s claim that it was entitled 
to more land than other states. This decision, United States v. Texas,431 
came in the aftermath of the Court’s 1947 decision that Pollard’s narrow 
 
 425. Id. at 251–52. 
 426. See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions 
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 124 (2004).  
 427. 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1871). 
 428. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).  
 429. Id. at 574.  
 430. See, e.g., Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919); Alamo Land & Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 
424 U.S. 295 (1976); see also ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). 
 431. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).  
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holding should not be extended to give coastal states a claim to 
ownership of submerged lands off their coasts, in part because of the 
significance of coastal areas to national security.432 Texas had then 
brought a separate case, arguing that it should be treated differently 
from the other coastal states, and asked the Court to find that it had 
retained ownership of submerged lands off its coasts, because it had 
been an independent sovereign before it was annexed to the Union and 
admitted as a new state. This meant its admission to the Union was 
uniquely433 the result of genuine bargaining between two independent 
sovereigns.434 
The Court rejected its claim. It emphasized that the equal footing 
clause in statehood enabling acts “does not, of course, include economic 
stature or standing,” because size, location, geology, and other factors 
“have created great diversity in the economic aspects of the several 
States.”435 The Court noted that a similar diversity existed regarding the 
amount of public lands within the borders of the various states, because 
some states “were sovereigns of their soil” when they entered the Union, 
and some “had within their boundaries tracts of land belonging to the 
Federal Government,” and many states entered into “special 
agreements with the Federal Government governing property within 
their borders,” citing Stearns.436 “The requirement of equal footing,” the 
Court reaffirmed, “was designed not to wipe out those diversities but to 
create parity as respects political standing and sovereignty.”437 
The Court then acknowledged that “equal footing” in the enabling 
acts has “long been held to have a direct effect on certain property 
rights,” citing Pollard and the cases applying it.438 It went on to hold 
that the idea “works the same way in the converse situation presented 
by this case,” so that it does not carry with it “any implied, special 
limitation of any of the paramount powers of the United States in favor 
of a State.”439 The Court assumed that prior to its annexation, the 
Republic of Texas “had not only full sovereignty over the marginal sea 
but ownership of it, of the land underlying it, and of all the riches which 
it held.”440 But when Texas ceased being an independent nation, joined 
the Union, and became a state on an ‘equal footing’ with all the other 
 
 432. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
 433. See supra text accompanying notes 108–109. Hawaii was an independent sovereign when it 
was annexed to the U.S. in 1898, but it became only a U.S. territory, and became the fiftieth state 
only in 1959. 
 434. See Hanna, supra note 45, at 519.  
 435. Texas, 339 U.S. at 716.  
 436. Id.  
 437. Id.  
 438. Id.  
 439. Id. at 717. 
 440. Id.  
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States, this “concededly entailed a relinquishment of some of her 
sovereignty.”441 As in United States v. California, the Court 
underscored the international relations and national security 
implications raised by Texas’s argument, and held that equal footing 
prevented Texas from extending her sovereignty “into a domain of 
political and sovereign power of the United States from which the other 
States have been excluded.”442 
A. A CLOSER LOOK AT “EQUAL SOVEREIGNTY” 
“Equal footing” and “equal sovereignty” seem to be two sides of the 
same coin because both refer to the power of governing. The Utah 
Paper, for example, discusses “equal sovereignty” in terms of the power 
to tax and exercise police powers and the right of eminent domain, and 
on the very next page discusses “equal footing” (which it describes as 
“based on the Equal Sovereignty Principle”) in almost exactly the same 
terms.443 
Comparing the scope of one state’s power to govern against that of 
other states is, on its face, a difficult task. How the presence of public 
lands affects state sovereignty is even more complicated, so correlating 
the scope of state sovereignty to the amount of public landholding in a 
particular state is very challenging. 
Consider, for example, that states can and routinely do apply many 
of their laws to activities carried out on public lands. A century ago, 
Justice Brandeis succinctly stated the general principle the U.S. 
Supreme Court has long applied: “The police power of the State extends 
over the federal public domain, at least when there is no legislation by 
Congress on the subject.”444 State laws dealing with crimes, torts, 
contracts and many other subjects routinely apply to most situations 
arising within state borders whether or not they occur on public lands. 
The Supreme Court has recognized, for example, that the states have 
nearly unlimited authority to apply their severance taxes to mines 
extracting federally-owned minerals from public land.445 Congress has 
even permitted states to levy certain taxes on lands over which they 
have ceded exclusive jurisdiction under the Enclave Clause.446 
Many state laws governing the use of natural resources within their 
borders apply to activities on public lands. FLPMA, for example, 
provides that nothing in it should be construed as “diminishing the 
 
 441. Id. at 717–18. 
 442. Id. at 718–20; see also Hanna, supra note 45, at 534.  
 443. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 51–52. 
 444. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918).  
 445. See Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); see also 30 U.S.C. § 189 
(2016); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762 (1876) (holding states can tax a miner’s interest in a mining 
claim on federal land).  
 446. See Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§ 103–110 (2012) (first adopted in 1947). 
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responsibility and authority of the States for management of fish and 
resident wildlife,” or as authorizing federal managers of public lands to 
require federal permits “to hunt and fish on public lands.”447 This 
means that, generally speaking, if one wants to hunt and fish on U.S. 
public lands that are open to such pursuits, one must secure a license 
from the state and conform to state game laws.448 Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has held that states may apply their general 
environmental regulations to activities being carried out on public 
lands.449 Congress has, moreover, instructed the Interior Secretary to 
make land use plans prepared for BLM-managed public lands 
“consistent with state and local plans to the maximum extent” 
consistent with federal law,450 and to provide in those plans for 
“compliance with applicable . . . state . . . air, water, noise, or other 
pollution standards or implementation plans.”451 
The application of so many state laws to so much activity on public 
lands cuts strongly against the idea that the mere presence of  
U.S.-owned lands limits state sovereignty. Similarly, the mere absence 
of U.S.-owned lands in a state does not necessarily enhance state 
sovereignty. To support its contention that Utah’s sovereignty is 
impaired by the presence of so much public land inside its borders, the 
Utah Paper points out that most other states have far less  
federally-owned acreage than Utah does; for example, only one-quarter 
of one per cent of the area of New York is public land.452 But the U.S. 
government exercises a great deal of authority over the nation’s 
financial industry, which is headquartered in the New York City. Those 
federal regulations pre-empt all conflicting state authority. 
All this is to say that the presence or absence of public lands is not 
a particularly good measure of the scope of a state’s sovereignty. Yet the 
Utah Paper makes the remarkable assertion that, in the “competition 
for national political power,” Utah has been “stunted by federal policy” 
because the U.S. “owns such a high percentage of its land,” making it a 
“second class State [with] respect to political standing, a result the 
Constitution clearly disallows.”453 
In fact, a cursory examination of the results of the 2016 election 
and other recent events show that states like Utah, with relatively small 
populations but a higher proportion of U.S. lands within their borders 
compared to other states, have an outsized political influence in the U.S. 
Congress and in the selection of Presidents. This is because the 
 
 447. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2016). 
 448. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). 
 449. See, e.g., California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).  
 450. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (2009). 
 451. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(8). 
 452. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 8. 
 453. Id. at 64. 
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Constitution gives every state two Senators, and the Electoral College 
likewise disproportionately favors states with fewer residents. There are 
many illustrations of how Utah and other like states have been able to 
use their disproportionate influence in the national government to 
leverage the presence of so many public lands within their borders to 
obtain more federal benefits, not less. 
For example, while public lands are immune from state and local 
property taxes, the U.S government has long operated several different 
programs that provide funds to state and local governments to 
“compensate” them for the fact that they cannot levy property taxes on 
U.S.-owned public lands.454 One of these is the so-called PILT 
(“payments in lieu of taxes”) program, enacted at the same time as 
FLPMA in 1976.455 PILT authorizes the U.S. government to provide 
subdivisions of state governments millions of federal dollars each year 
to make up for their inability to levy property taxes on public land.456 As 
the Supreme Court has noted, the United States “had for many years 
been providing payments to partially compensate state and local 
governments for revenues lost as a result of the presence of tax-exempt 
federal lands within their borders,” and PILT was designed to correct “a 
number of flaws in the existing programs.”457 
It is fiendishly difficult to assess whether these programs over- or 
under-compensate states and localities; that is, whether the U.S. 
provides more or fewer dollar benefits than a state or local jurisdiction 
would obtain if the public lands within its borders were state- or 
privately-owned. The answer depends upon many facts and 
assumptions including, for example, how much jurisdictions rely on 
property taxes versus other forms of taxes to fund their governmental 
operations.458 In recommending a general PILT program, the Public 
Land Law Review Commission specified that PILT payments “should 
not represent full tax equivalence and the state and local tax effort 
should be a factor in determining the exact amount to be paid.”459 In 
this connection, it is noteworthy that Utah’s effective property tax rate 
on owner-occupied housing is lower than those of forty other states.460 
 
 454. M. LYNNE CORN, PILT (PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES): SOMEWHAT SIMPLIFIED, CONG. RES. 
SERV. (2015). 
 455. Pub. L. No. 94-565 (Oct. 20, 1976), codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6907.  
 456. See infra text accompanying note 458 (regarding whether such programs over- or under-
compensate states and localities).  
 457. Lawrence Cty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 262 (1985). 
 458. See COMPENSATING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF FEDERAL 
LANDS: WHAT IS FAIR AND CONSISTENT?, CONG. RES. SERV. (2012).  
 459. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LANDS, supra note 93, at 4.  
 460. Jared Walczak, How High Are Property Taxes in Your State?, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://taxfoundation.org/how-high-are-property-taxes-your-state/.  
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In 1979, the U.S. General Accounting Office reviewed these 
programs and concluded that overall, they over-compensated 
localities.461 In 1999, researchers in the U.S. Forest Service reported 
that while federal payments in lieu of taxes were significantly less than 
equivalent property taxes overall, in more than sixty percent of the 
counties examined, the payments at least equaled property taxes.462 In 
2010, an independent research group found that achieving true 
equivalency would require increasing total federal payments to all 
counties combined, but that two-thirds of the counties would actually 
receive lower payments.463 The consensus, then, seems to be that these 
programs overcompensate some counties and undercompensate others. 
The Utah Paper argues that programs like PILT are not a benefit of 
continuing public land ownership, but instead are simply an example of 
how western states are “forced to rely on federal subsidies” to fund 
“basic operations,” which subjects them to “undue political pressures 
inconsistent with equal sovereignty.”464 In fact, however, it is more 
accurate to say that members of Congress feel the political pressure if 
they do not appropriate sufficient funds to the PILT program. Such 
programs are popular in the Congress, especially strongly supported by 
its western members; indeed, Congress has never failed to fund the 
program since it was adopted. After the Trump Administration called 
for cutting PILT appropriations soon after taking office, for example, 
Congress, led by its members from states with significant amounts of 
public lands, declined to do so.465 Utah’s revenue stream from PILT 
payments has increased nearly 400% since 1999, while per pupil 
spending has increased only fifty percent, just above the cumulative 
inflation rate over the same period.466 
States like Utah with large amounts of public land derive other 
special benefits from the presence of these lands. For nearly a century, 
the United States has given each stateeither directly, or indirectly 
 
 461. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., ALTERNATIVES FOR ACHIEVING GREATER EQUITIES IN FEDERAL 
LAND PAYMENT PROGRAMS (1979). 
 462. Ervin G. Schuster et al., An Analysis of PILT-Related Payments and Likely Property Tax 
Liability of Federal Resource Management Lands, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE (1999), 
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HEADWATERS ECON. (Dec. 2010), https://headwaterseconomics.org/county-payments/ 
history-context/reforming-federal-land-payments-to-counties/; see also Federal Lands in the West: 
Liability or Asset?, HEADWATERS ECONOMICS (Feb. 2017), https://headwaterseconomics.org/ 
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 464. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 68.  
 465. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. 115–31 (signed into law on May  
5, 2017, making $465 million available for PILT).  
 466. Brenton Peterson, Opinion, The Biggest Lie in Utah’s Public Lands Debate, DESERET NEWS 
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through the Reclamation Fund earmarked for water projects in the 
western statesninety percent of the revenues it derives from the 
development of fossil fuels the U.S. owns within its borders.467 To take 
another example, the formula in federal law that allocates federal 
highway construction dollars among states has long provided extra 
federal funds to those states with larger amounts of public land within 
their borders.468 Although such benefits plainly add to a state’s “power 
to govern,” the Utah Paper ignores them. Instead, it simply complains 
that state sovereignty is impaired by the fact that the state must seek 
U.S. consent in order to build state and local transportation facilities on 
public lands.469 
The connection between public lands and a state’s sovereignty can 
also be explored from the opposite perspective. Would Utah have more 
“power to govern” if it actually assumed ownership of public lands 
within its borders? Just about every available studyincluding one 
several hundred pages long commissioned by the State of Utah and 
delivered in late 2014shows that taking over ownership of public 
lands would, on balance, likely be a large net drain on state 
treasuries.470 
The most obvious, though not the only, reason for this is the 
increasingly large amounts of federal taxpayer dollars being spent to 
fight wildfires on public and nearby non-public land. These fires are 
fought primarily to protect structures on private inholdings and 
adjacent private lands. Such structures and their immediate environs 
are, generally speaking, subject only to zoning, construction and fire 
safety codes, if any, of state and local governments. The rationale for the 
U.S. bearing nearly all of these firefighting costs is that the U.S. owns 
significant amounts of public lands in the affected area. In the last 
couple of decades, primarily because of hotter and drier conditions, and 
more dwellings being constructed on non-federal lands near public 
lands, the portion of the total U.S. Forest Service budget that is devoted 
to firefighting has increased from ten percent to more than fifty 
percent.471 
If the federal government were no longer to own public lands, the 
rationale for the U.S. spending money to fight these fires would largely 
evaporate. That would almost certainly mean that the responsibility for 
fighting wildfires would likely fall on state and local governments and 
 
 467. See, e.g., ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note 93, at 235.  
 468. See 23 U.S.C. § 120 (2012).  
 469. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 51, 69–70.  
 470. See, e.g., Transfer of Public Lands Act and Study, supra note 7. 
 471. See, e.g., Summary: Wildfire Costs, New Development, and Rising Temperatures, 
HEADWATERS ECON. (Apr. 2016), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wildfire/fire-research-summary/.  
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the private sector, just as it does in other parts of the country where 
there are few public lands. 
Once again, rather than acknowledging that Utah is the beneficiary 
of public-land-related federal largesse, the Utah Paper chooses instead, 
rather cheekily, to portray Utah as the victim, complaining that Utah 
“must depend upon” the federal land management agencies “for the fire 
safety of its citizens,” thus “impinging upon its sovereignty” and 
denying it “equal sovereignty with thirty-eight other states.”472 
One can understand why both the courts and the Congress might 
look skeptically upon such arguments, for in essence the authors of the 
Utah Paper seek to have it both ways: If the federal government does 
not fully fund wildfire fighting, it is penalizing the state. But if it retains 
ownership of the public lands that provide the rationale for such 
funding, it is denying the state “equal sovereignty.” 
Skepticism might deepen with the realization that, in other venues, 
far from complaining about the presence of public landholdings, Utah 
acknowledges that it derives major economic and public relations 
benefits from them. The Utah State Department of Tourism has for 
some time been running a publicity campaign urging people to visit its 
“Mighty 5” national parks, noting with pride that these public lands 
“draw several million visitors from around the world each year to 
marvel at surreal scenery and unforgettable activities.”473 And those 
visitors spend money and boost the state’s economy, as many studies 
document.474 
VI.  OTHER PROBLEMS 
Those advocating for judicially enforceable constitutional limits on 
U.S. ownership of public lands inside states generally have very little to 
say about two key issues their position raises: first, how much public 
landholding in a state violates the Constitution, and second, what is the 
proper remedy for that violation. The failure to squarely confront these 
issues undermines the credibility of the position. 
New states have been admitted to the Union with widely varying 
sizes, different geographical settings, climates, natural resources and 
other features. The U.S. has granted these states very different amounts 
of public lands, and had kept or acquired ownership of very different 
amounts of public lands in each. The challenges to the judiciary of 
drawing a constitutional line through such wide variations, and 
 
 472. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 65–66.  
 473. The Mighty 5: Utah’s National Parks, UTAH OFF. OF TOURISM, https://www.visitutah.com/ 
places-to-go/most-visited-parks/the-mighty-5/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 474. See, e.g., JENNIFER LEAVER, THE STATE OF UTAH’S TRAVEL AND TOURISM INDUSTRY 2017, KEM 
C. GARDNER POL’Y INST., UNIV. OF UTAH (2017). 
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fashioning a remedy if the line has been crossed, are daunting to say the 
least. 
This can be illustrated by looking at other constitutional clauses. 
For example, the Constitution commands that Congress treat states 
equally in the so-called “uniformity” clause, which requires that all 
“Duties, Imposts, and Excises” be “uniform throughout the states,”475 a 
much more explicit command than the idea of “equal sovereignty.” 
Calling it “an enormously complex problem,” the Court declined an 
invitation to use this clause to second-guess Congress’s decision to 
exempt oil produced in the northern part of Alaska from an otherwise 
generally applicable windfall profits tax.476 
The Utah Paper argues at one point that only twelve of the fifty 
states are without “equal sovereignty,”477 because only eleven other 
states “are in positions similar to Utah with regard to public lands.”478 
The state of Washington ranks twelfth in the list of states in the 
percentage of its area in public lands, at twenty-nine percent.479 
Thirteenth is Hawaii, at about twenty percent.480 The Utah Paper never 
attempts to explain why some or all of the public lands in Washington 
are unconstitutional while, at the same time, apparently none of the 
public lands in Hawaii are. (The nine percent difference between 
Hawaii and Washington is substantially less than the seventeen percent 
gap between Utah and Nevada.) At another point, the Utah Paper seems 
to draw the line at fifty percent, between Oregon (fifty-three percent 
federal lands) and California (forty-six percent federal lands), for it says 
that the Supreme Court “has never addressed” whether Congress can 
“forever retain the majority of the land within a State.”481 
The Paper also never makes clear whether public lands managed 
by the Defense Department, the U.S. Forest Service, the National Park 
Service, or the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service are subject to its “equal 
sovereignty” claim. The Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution draws 
no distinctions among the purposes public lands serve. The Utah 
 
 475. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 476. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983); see also Commonwealth Edison v. 
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981) (doubting “whether any legal test could adequately reflect the 
numerous and competing economic, geographic, demographic, social, and political considerations 
that must inform a decision” about whether a particular rate of state taxation violates the dormant 
commerce clause, which “reinforces the conclusion that [such] questions . . . must be resolved 
through the political process.”). 
 477. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 65–66. 
 478. Id. at 139; see also id. at 62.  
 479. See CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA, CONG. 
RES. SERV. (2017). The top seventeen states in percentage of federal land are NV (80), UT (63); ID 
(62), AK (61) Or (53); CA (46); AZ (39); CO (36); NM (35) MT (29) WA (29); HI (20); NH (14); AR 
and FL (13); MI and VA (10). Id. 
 480. Id. 
 481. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). 
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Paper’s position seems to be that a state, or perhaps a federal courtin 
any event, not the U.S. Congresswould have the ultimate power to 
decide how much if any land now found in national parks, forests, or 
other designations it would be constitutional for the U.S. to own in that 
state. 
The American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”), a nonprofit 
organization that drafts and advocates conservative legislation for state 
legislators,482 is not so reticent. It directly confronts this question in its 
model resolution on the subject.483 After calling for all the public lands 
in the western states to be transferred to the states, the resolution 
provides that “to promote legitimate federal interests,” the western 
states should, upon gaining title to all public lands, “agree to 
affirmatively cede lands for the national park system, the national 
wilderness preservation system, and lands reserved for federal military 
use” to the national government under certain conditions.484 The states 
would keep the remainder of the public lands for themselves. 
The Utah Paper also undermines its argument by conceding several 
times that the U.S. can retain title to public lands after statehood so 
long as it does not do so “forever.”485 In fact, Congress has never said it 
will hold any or all public land in U.S. ownership “forever.” For 
example, FLPMA merely creates a presumption against divestiture of 
BLM-managed land,486 itself contains some provisions authorizing sales 
and other transfers of ownership of public lands,487 and also leaves 
some other divestiture laws in place.488 
Even if Congress were to enact a statute repealing all laws 
authorizing divestiture and declaring its intention to hold title to all 
public lands “forever,” it could not bind future Congresses. To the 
extent the Utah Paper contends that only a “permanent” retention of 
title by the U.S. violates “equal sovereignty,” then, it must fail of its own 
accord. 
The courts have acknowledged that, where public lands are 
concerned, it is up to the political branches, and not the courts, to 
 
 482. See ALEC Exposed, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY, http://www.alecexposed.org/ 
wiki/ALEC_Exposed (last visited Jan. 20, 2018); see also Lyndsey Gilpin, How an East Coast think 
tank is fueling the land transfer movement, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 26, 2016), 
http://www.hcn.org/articles/how-an-east-coast-think-tank-is-fueling-the-land-transfer-movement 
(noting that the past chairman of ALEC’s Federalism Task Force, Utah state legislator Ken Ivory, is a 
leading advocate of the position in the Utah Paper, and that the President of the Utah State Senate is 
a member of ALEC’s Board of Directors). 
 483. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36.  
 484. Id.  
 485. See, e.g., id. at 2, 4, 9.  
 486. See supra text accompanying note 32.  
 487. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713, 1721, 1722.  
 488. See e.g., Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21 et ff.; see also Recreation and Public Purposes 
Act of 1926, 43 U.S.C. §§ 869.  
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decide such matters. In the Pickett Act of 1910, Congress gave the 
President authority to withdraw public lands from the operation of 
divestiture laws for various public purposes, but only “temporarily.” It 
also provided that such withdrawals “shall remain in force until revoked 
by him or by an Act of Congress.”489 The courts have refused to second-
guess presidential and congressional judgments as to when a 
withdrawal ceased to be “temporary,” by leaving in place unrevoked 
Pickett Act withdrawals many decades old.490 
The U.S. Supreme Court has often expressed a reluctance to insert 
itself into disputes involving constitutional principles unless it was 
convinced that “judicially discoverable and manageable standards”491 
exist to govern the Court’s decisions. The Utah Paper offers no 
standards, nor do any come readily to mind, by which the courts could 
determine how much U.S.-owned land inside a state violates a norm of 
“equal sovereignty.” 
A. THE WESTERN STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL REJECT THE CONCLUSIONS 
OF THE UTAH PAPER 
In August 2014, the Conference of Western [State] Attorneys 
General (“CWAG”) established a study team composed of lawyers in 
several state Attorney General offices to examine the legal arguments 
put forth in the Utah Paper and elsewhere. The team was chaired by the 
Wyoming Attorney General, and included attorneys from counterpart 
offices in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington.492 While these lawyers had a 
state perspective, they had little if any financial stake in the conclusions, 
unlike the contracted-for authors of the Utah Paper, who were trying to 
persuade the state of Utah to hire them to litigate the case that their 
Paper concluded could credibly be made.493 
The CWAG Study Team’s Report, completed in 2016,494 took issue 
with the Utah Paper’s conclusions, and the general idea that western 
states had a judicially enforceable constitutional claim to the public 
lands. It found the constitutional case for state ownership of public 
lands to be weak, citing the long, unbroken line of U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions discussed above.495 It concluded that Supreme Court 
 
 489. 43 U.S.C. §141, repealed 1976.  
 490. See Mecham v. Udall, 369 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1966).  
 491. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 492. See REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LANDS SUBCOMMITTEE, WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL LITIGATION 
ACTION COMM., CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL (2016) [hereinafter CWAG Report].  
 493. The Utah Paper estimated that if its “Legal Consulting Services Team” were hired to pursue 
the litigation the team recommended, the total cost to Utah will be on the order of $14 million. 
HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 145.  
 494. CWAG Report, supra note 492.  
 495. Id. at 16; see also supra text accompanying note 492.  
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precedents “provide little support” for the idea that equal footing or 
equal sovereignty applies to public land ownership.496 It also found that 
the “clear weight of relevant decisions” by the U.S. Supreme Court is 
that the Enclave Clause does not limit the authority of the U.S. to own 
public lands.497 
In July 2016, the Western States Attorneys General voted eleven to 
one to accept the report.498 The margin was noteworthy because some 
of the state Attorneys General who voted to accept the report had earlier 
expressed support for Utah’s position. In 2014, for example, the Arizona 
Attorney General had called for the states to do everything they can to 
“get our land back from the federal government,” and the Colorado 
Attorney General had said it was time the western state Attorneys 
General “join together” and take “back that land.”499 
Noting that each state’s enabling act is different, the CWAG Report 
did not address Utah’s “compact” theory.500 However, as explained 
earlier,501 the Utah Enabling Act weakens, not strengthens, Utah’s 
argument that the U.S. had implicitly agreed to divest itself of 
ownership of all federal lands in the state. 
B. THE UTAH PAPER’S LEGAL CLAIM IS STALE 
The United States has owned the majority of land in Utah since it 
was admitted to the Union more than 120 years ago.502 Seeking to 
explain the long delay in raising its “equal sovereignty” argument, the 
Utah Paper argues that the state had “little reason” to pursue its claim 
for many decades because the U.S. “repeatedly promised to dispose of” 
the public lands it retained, and “did so as a matter of stated policy until 
1976, when it abruptly decided to stop,” referring to enactment of 
FLPMA.503 Each of these assertions is at odds with the facts. 
 
 496. Id. at 47. 
 497. Id. at 21. 
 498. Michelle L. Price, Attorneys General Cast Doubt on Utah Land Push, APNEWSBREAK (Sept. 
30, 2016), https://apnews.com/e8a2cd9143e14b3397c5ba8d2bfde9c0/apnewsbreak-attorneys-gen 
eral-cast-doubt-utah-land-push. The official vote tally was not made public.  
 499. See Neil Young, Brnovich Visits Mohave County, MOHAVE VALLEY DAILY NEWS (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.mohavedailynews.com/news/brnovich-claims-he-is-a-better-candidate-than-current-state/ 
article_f9d79a72-c927-11e3-9bf5-0019bb2963f4.html; Steve Benen, Colorado A.G. Candidate: It’s Time 
‘We Took Back’ Federal Land, THE MADDOWBLOG (Oct. 15, 2014, 11:38 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/ 
rachel-maddow-show/colorado-ag-candidate-its-time-we-took-back-federal-land.  
 500. CWAG Report, supra note 492, at 48. 
 501. See supra text accompanying notes 373–391. 
 502. See UTAH AUTOMATED GEOGRAPHIC REF. CTR., Land Ownership (2017), ArcGIS data, 
https://gis.utah.gov/data/cadastre/land-ownership/. 
 503. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 4, at 112; see also id. at 83. FLPMA is found at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1701–82 (2012). 
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First, as noted earlier, the U.S. never promised, explicitly or 
implicitly, at statehood, or at any time thereafter, to divest itself of 
ownership of all public lands in the state.504 
Second, FLPMA did not “stop” all divestiture of public lands; as 
noted above, it only established a general and rebuttable presumption 
against further divestiture, and left some divestiture laws in place.505 
Moreover, while an underlying theme of the Utah Paper is that 
Utah and other western states with significant amounts of public lands 
are victims of a distant, unresponsive national government, it is 
noteworthy that FLPMA was largely shaped and supported by members 
of Congress from western states. Fourteen of the seventeen members of 
the congressional conference committee that crafted the final version of 
FLPMA, for example, were westerners.506 Furthermore, FLPMA mostly 
carried out recommendations of the congressionally-dominated 1970 
report of the Public Land Law Review Commission established in 
1964,507 and thirteen of the nineteen signatories to the Commission’s 
final report were from western states, including eleven of the thirteen 
congressional members, and three of the six presidentially-appointed 
members.508 
Third, FLPMA’s adoption of a presumption against further 
divestiture was hardly “abrupt.” Large-scale divestiture of federal lands 
in the lower forty-eight states actually ended in the 1930s, not 1976. 
Following the abandonment in 1931 of President Hoover’s proposal to 
transfer arid public lands thought to be suitable primarily for livestock 
grazing to willing states,509 Utah Representative Don Colton introduced 
a bill creating a mechanism in federal law for regulating livestock 
grazing on these lands, assuming they were going to remain in federal 
ownership.510 His bill passed the House in 1932 but got no further.511 
After he was defeated for reelection that fall, Congressman Edward 
Taylor of Colorado reintroduced a similar bill in the next Congress,512 
and what became known as the Taylor Grazing Act was signed into law 
by President Franklin Roosevelt in June 1934.513 
The stated purpose of the Act was to “stop injury to the public 
grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration,” to 
 
 504. See supra text accompanying notes 373–391.  
 505. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 487–488. 
 506. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1724, at 66 (1976); reprinted in Sen. Comm. on Energy and Nat. 
Resources, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976, at 871, 936 (1978).  
 507. See Pub. L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964). 
 508. See ONE THIRD OF NATION’S LAND, supra note 93, at iv.  
 509. See supra text accompanying notes 406–410. 
 510. See Peffer, supra note 404, at 215. The bill was H.R. 11816, 72d Cong. 1st sess. 
 511. Peffer, supra note 404, at 216. 
 512. Id. 
 513. Id. at 216–20.  
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provide for their “orderly use, improvement, and development,” and to 
“stabilize the livestock industry dependent upon the public range.”514 It 
authorized the Interior Secretary to establish grazing districts on public 
lands “chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops,” and to 
manage these lands to carry out the purposes of the act.515 In November 
1934 and February 1935, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued 
two executive orders withdrawing practically all the public lands that 
were then still generally available for divestiture from most divestiture 
laws.516 In June 1936, Congress effectively approved Roosevelt’s Orders 
by incorporating them into amendments to the Taylor Grazing Act.517 
The leading historian of the public lands in this era called this 
combination of congressional and executive actions in 1934-1936 a 
“radical change in direction of public land policy,” making the idea of 
public lands open to wholesale divestiture “more a sentimental and 
political issue than an active factor in American life.”518 
C. THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION OF 1979–1981: A POLITICAL GESTURE 
DISGUISED AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM 
In 1979, Nevada launched what became known as the “sagebrush 
rebellion” by enacting a statute claiming ownership of public lands 
within its borders managed by the Bureau of Land Management 
(“BLM”). Arizona, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming followed suit, and 
Wyoming also claimed ownership of national forest lands managed by 
the U.S. Forest Service.519 
Ostensibly, this “rebellion” sought to convert a version of the 
political argument for cession offered by John McKinley and a few 
others in 1827–1830 into a legal claim for ownership of the public 
lands. In reality, however, it was put forth only as a political gesture. 
Almost immediately after its “sagebrush rebellion” law was enacted, 
Nevada’s representatives quietly sought and obtained assurance from 
the Interior Department that the federal money its local governments 
 
 514. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (prior to 1936 
amendment).  
 515. Id. (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315(f)).  
 516. See Exec. Order No. 6910 (Nov. 26, 1934); see also Exec. Order No. 6964 (Feb. 5, 1935); 
Peffer, supra note 404, at 223–24. 
 517. Pub. L. No. 74-827, 49 Stat. 1976 (1936) (amending § 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act).  
 518. Peffer, supra note 404, at 224. 
 519. Similar bills were introduced in most of the other western states, but not enacted. See Leshy, 
supra note 12, at 317 n.1. The Washington legislature approved a similar statute in 1980, contingent 
upon the voters approving a proposed amendment to the state constitution revoking the disclaimer 
regarding public lands, but voters rejected the amendment that fall. Act of Mar. 10, 1980 ch. 116, 
1980 Wash. Laws 358. Alaska adopted a similar statute through a ballot initiative in November 1982, 
but the State Attorney General refused to enforce it, finding that it conflicted with the public lands 
disclaimer clause in the state constitution. See Esther Wunnicke, 1983 WL 42679 (1983). 
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were receiving under the PILT520 programpayments that are 
bottomed on continuing U.S. ownership of public landswould not be 
interrupted.521 
None of the five states that enacted statutes claiming ownership of 
public lands ever filed litigation or took any other step to enforce its 
claim. In fact, Nevada declined a clear opportunity to litigate the claim 
in a case it had earlier filed challenging a U.S. moratorium on the 
operation of certain public land divestiture laws.522 
The “rebellion” fizzled out in 1981-1982, and never resulted in any 
significant divestiture of public land.523 Some years later, while 
challenging Congress’s decision to locate a high-level nuclear waste 
repository in Nevada, the state unsuccessfully argued various theories 
that the Constitution requires equal treatment among the states.524 
D. A “MINI-REBELLION” IN THE 1990S GAINS NO TRACTION 
Some rural western counties and ranchers made an effort to revive 
the rebellion in the 1990s. Nevada ranchers defending litigation the 
U.S. brought against them for grazing their livestock on public lands 
without a permit claimed that U.S. ownership of public lands was 
unconstitutional. This time, however, no state enacted laws claiming 
ownership of federal lands. Instead, the Attorneys General of several 
states, including Alaska, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico and Oregon, 
filed an amicus brief on the side of the United States. Their brief noted 
that it was “well-established that the United States is the lawful owner 
of the public lands[,]”525 even though at least one of the states (Nevada) 
still had a law on the books claiming ownership of the public lands.526 
The Ninth Circuit ruled against the ranchers and for the United States, 
and the Supreme Court declined to review the decision.527 
 
 520. See supra text accompanying notes 454–457.  
 521. See Richard M. Mollison and Richard W. Eddy, Jr., The Sagebrush Rebellion: A Simplistic 
Response to the Complex Problems of Federal Land Management, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 125 
(1982). The author attended this meeting with Nevada representatives in Washington D.C. in late 
1978, where he was serving as Associate Solicitor of the Interior Department for Energy & Resources, 
with responsibility for the public lands. 
 522. Nevada v. United States, 699 F.2d 486, 487 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 523. See Robert H. Nelson, Why the Sagebrush Revolt Burned Out, REGULATION  
27, 33 (May–June 1984), https://www.cato.org/regulation/mayjune-1984. 
 524. Nevada v. Watkins, 913 F.2d 1545, 1553–58 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S.  
906 (1991); Nuclear Energy Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1303–09 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 525. Brief of the States of New Mexico, Alaska, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at  
5, Gardner v. United States, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-17042). 
 526. See 1979 NEV. REV. STAT. § 321.5973.  
 527. United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 907 (1997).  
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E. DISCONTENTED STATES HAVE ALWAYS HAD A POLITICAL REMEDY 
This is another reason why the courts should rebuff any attempt by 
a state to use the Constitution to wrest ownership of public lands from 
the United States. The Property Clause gives Congress authority to 
enact legislation conveying some or all of the public lands in Utah (and 
everywhere else they are found) to the states or to othersincluding 
public lands designated as national parks, forests, wildlife refuges, and 
even military bases. For example, after the Supreme Court had issued a 
series of decisions in 1947–1950 rejecting the claim of coastal states to 
ownership of the submerged lands off the nation’s coasts,528 these states 
turned to Congress. In 1953, Congress enacted the so-called Submerged 
Lands Act. It gave the coastal states title to the submerged lands within 
three miles of the coast or, in the case of Texas and the portion of 
Florida bordering the Gulf of Mexico, within three leagues.529 The Court 
upheld the legislation against several challenges.530 
Also relevant here is President Herbert Hoover’s 1931 offer to 
support congressional legislation to transfer to the states, minus the 
mineral rights, title to all the public lands in the west believed to be 
useful primarily for livestock grazing. As discussed earlier, the states, 
led by Utah’s Governor George Dern, spurned the offer, and Congress 
never seriously considered it.531 
F. THE CURRENT POLITICS OF PUBLIC LAND TRANSFERS 
As this is written, Utah’s efforts to persuade other states to join its 
quest for ownership of public lands seem to be failing. Unlike the  
1979–1980 Sagebrush Rebellion, when five intermountain western 
states made a formal claim of ownership, no state has joined with Utah. 
In 2012, by contrast, Arizona voters rejected, by a two to one margin, a 
proposed amendment to the state constitution that would have claimed 
“sovereign and exclusive authority” over most public lands in the 
state.532 The western states’ Attorneys General have refused to take up 
 
 528. See supra text accompanying notes 364–366, 431–442.  
 529. Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315 (2012).  
 530. See Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); 
United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960). See generally Sonia Sotomayor, Note, Statehood and the 
Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case for Puerto Rican Seabed Rights, 88 YALE L.J. 825, 833 (1979). 
Professor Hanna, writing before enactment of the Submerged Lands Act, thought the matter was 
“appropriately within the area of Congressional discretion.” Hanna, supra note 45, at 536.  
 531. See supra text accompanying notes 404–410; Peffer, supra note 404, at 208–09. 
 532. See Official Canvas 2012 General ElectionNovember 6, 2012, ARIZ. SECRETARY OF  
ST. 18 (Dec. 3, 2012), http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2012/General/Canvass2012GE.pdf 
(referencing Proposition 120); see also Ballot Pamphlet, Gen. Election (Nov. 6, 2012) text of 
Proposition 120 http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2012/info/PubPamphlet/Sun_Sounds/english/ 
Prop120.htm. 
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the cause.533 Public opinion polls in every western state consistently 
show support for continued ownership and management of public lands 
by the national government. The most recent “Conservation in the West 
Poll” conducted for Colorado College’s State of the Rockies Project 
shows that, in six of the seven intermountain western states, a strong 
majority oppose giving states control over public land. In the only 
exception, Utah, opinion is divided.534 
The history of the cession movement in the late 1820s suggests that 
Utah risks political backlash by continuing to press its claim. There, 
most members of Congress from other states reacted negatively to the 
radical argument for cession made by Senator John McKinley and 
others. History could repeat itself, and the Utah claim might be 
characterized as an inappropriate grab for public lands acquired with 
the “blood and treasure” of the earlier-admitted states, “one of the most 
extravagant pretensions that could possibly be urged,” a “preposterous” 
and “grasping” claim that might be compared “to the whining of a 
spoiled child.”535 
Demographic and economic changes underscore this risk. Seven of 
the nine fastest-growing states in population in the last few years were 
western states with substantial amounts of public landsIdaho, 
Nevada, Utah, Washington, Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon.536 Polls 
show that an important factor driving migration to these states has to 
do with accessible outdoor recreation opportunities.537 Several studies 
comparing economic prosperity across counties in the west show a 
direct positive correlation between the proportion of protected public 
lands in a county and its economic well-being.538 Bloomberg View 
recently noted that Utah is rated number one in “future livability” 
among the states based on various economic, health, and lifestyle 
 
 533. See supra text accompanying notes 493–500. 
 534. COLO. COLL. STATE OF THE ROCKIES PROJECT, CONSERVATION IN THE WEST POLL, PUBLIC LANDS 
2 (2017), https://www.coloradocollege.edu/other/stateoftherockies/conservationinthewest/2017/ 
PublicLands_Topic_17.pdf. 
 535. See supra text accompanying notes 154–178; see also Dale A. Oesterle, The Public Land: 
How Much Is Enough?, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 521, 558 (1996). 
 536. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Idaho is Nation’s Fastest-Growing State, Census 
Bureau Reports (Dec. 20, 2017) https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2017/ 
estimates-idaho.html. In fact, these same western states have been among the fastest growing states 
in the union nearly every decade since 1900. See Andrew Van Dam, Why People Really Want to 
Move to Idaho but are Fleeing Its Neighbor, Wyoming, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/26/2017s-fastest-and-slowest-growing-
states-are-neighbors-heres-why-their-paths-diverged.  
 537. See supra note 534.  
 538. See West Is Best: How Public Lands in the West Create a Competitive Economic 
Advantage, HEADWATERS ECON. 19–20 (Nov. 2012), https://headwaterseconomics.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/West_Is_Best_Full_Report.pdf; see also https://headwaterseconomic 
s.org/public-lands/public-lands-research/. 
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measures, and has one of the top performing economies in the U.S.539 If 
one is tempted to think that the sizeable amount of public land in states 
like Utah leaves them no room to accommodate more people, consider 
this: Utah, like many other large western states, has considerably more 
private land per capita than do many other statesabout 3.8 acres of 
private land for every state resident, compared to less than one acre of 
private land per capita in New York, 1.24 acres in California, 2.18 acres 
in Ohio, and 3.3 acres in Georgia.540 These data and trends make it 
difficult to take seriously the argument that Utah and other states with 
large amounts of public land are being strangled by the presence of so 
much public land within their borders. 
In the last few decades, a new element has emerged in discussions 
about public lands; namely, they have become more politically partisan. 
From the nation’s earliest days, disagreements on the most 
fundamental questions of federal public land policy rarely broke neatly 
along party lines. While there were occasionally partisan disagreements 
on particular measures, both parties tended to move together on the 
broad question of divesting or retaining large tracts of public lands in 
U.S. ownership. Republicans and Democrats united to keep more than 
two hundred millions of acres of land in national ownership between 
1890 and 1915. The opposition likewise did not break down on party 
lines. Some of the staunchest opponents of Republican President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s vigorous public land protection policies were 
members of his own party in Congress.541 Opinion on these matters did 
not divide along sectional lines either. Theodore Roosevelt carried every 
western state in his re-election campaign in 1904.542 
This consensus tradition of bipartisanship endured into the 
modern era. Republican President Richard Nixon’s 1971 Environmental 
Message noted that the public lands “belong to all Americans,” being 
“part of the heritage and the birthright of every citizen.”543 Therefore, he 
wrote, because “we deal with these lands as trustees for the future” they 
must “be managed wisely,” and “their environmental values be carefully 
safeguarded.”544 Similarly, the 1972 Republican Party Platform extolled 
 
 539. Matthew A. Winkler, Opinion, Want a Formula for Success? Study Utah, BLOOMBERG VIEW 
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 540. See New Analysis: More Private and State Lands Per Capita in Western States than 
Eastern States, CTR. FOR W. PRIORITIES (Apr. 28, 2015), http://westernpriorities.org/2015/04/28/ 
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 541. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE 
CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 521–22, 642, 676–80 (2009).  
 542. See Election of 1904, Am. Presidency Project; http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
showelection.php?year=1904; see also supra text accompanying notes 394–403. 
 543. Special Message to the Congress Proposing the 1971 Environmental Program, 1971 PUB. 
PAPERS 125 (Feb. 8, 1971), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3294. 
 544. Id. at 5.  
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the virtues of the public lands, noting that they “provide us with natural 
beauty, wilderness and great recreational opportunities as well as 
minerals, timber, food and fiber.”545 Accordingly, it continued, “[w]e 
pledge to develop and manage these lands in a balanced way, both to 
protect the irreplaceable environment and to maximize the benefits of 
their use to our society. We will continue these conservation efforts in 
the years ahead.”546 
By 2016, the bipartisan consensus seemed to have frayed. 
According to the 2016 Republican Party Platform, federal “ownership or 
management” of the nation’s public lands “places an economic burden 
on counties and local communities in terms of lost revenue to pay for 
things such as schools, police, and emergency services,” so it is “absurd 
to think that all that acreage must remain under the absentee 
ownership or management of official Washington.”547 The Platform 
called upon Congress to “immediately pass universal legislation 
providing for a timely and orderly mechanism requiring the federal 
government to convey certain federally controlled public lands to 
states.”548 Though conveniently not defining “certain,” nor providing 
any guideposts for identifying which public lands should be transferred, 
it went on to call upon “all national and state leaders and 
representatives to exert their utmost power and influence to urge the 
transfer of those lands, identified in the review process, to all willing 
states for the benefit of the states and the nation as a whole.”549 The 
2016 Platform plank on public lands reflects an ideology the Republican 
Party has been embracing intermittently since the 1994 elections. The 
1996, 2000, and 2012 Platforms had included somewhat similar 
recommendations, though in tones not as strident as the most recent 
one.550 The Democratic Party platforms, by contrast, have never 
mentioned divestiture, but rather have regarded public lands as an 
important positive feature of American life.551 
 
 545. See Republican Party Platform of 1972, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
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Only time will tell whether the very different view expressed in 
more recent Republican Platforms will turn into a viable political 
movement in Congress to divest the U.S. of ownership or control of 
significant amounts of land. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments in the Utah Paper reflect an incomplete, defective 
understanding of U.S. legal and political history; an extremely selective, 
skewed reading of numerous Supreme Court decisions and federal laws; 
a misleading characterization of the extent to which state laws and 
policy apply on and influence federal policy with respect to public lands; 
and a misuse of the dictionary. As a result, its conclusion that 
“legitimate legal theories exist to pursue litigation in an effort to gain 
ownership or control of the public lands in Utah” is unpersuasive.552 
For well over two centuries, the national political process has 
determined the nation’s policy toward its public lands. An unbroken 
skein of Supreme Court decisions since the Civil War has allowed that 
process to operate without any questioning by the federal judiciary of 
the national government’s constitutional authority to retain ownership 
of public lands and manage them for broad public purposes. 
The nation’s long experience with extensive public landholdings 
has created deeply held expectations built on this clear understanding 
that fundamental public land policy decisions are made through the 
political, and not the judicial, process. Accepting the arguments in the 
Utah Paper would, by overthrowing that understanding, unsettle those 
expectations. If its bedrock premisethat the federal courts should take 
responsibility for determining how much if any land the U.S. 
Constitution permits the national government to own in a statewere 
accepted, the validity of thousands of federal laws could be thrown into 
doubt, and hundreds of thousands if not millions of property 
transactions that have been based upon those laws could be called into 
question. 
Rather than start down such a perilous path, the courts would 
almost certainly simply follow the Supreme Court’s clear teachings. 
Besides all the decisions noted earlier, the Court has several times 
signaled extreme reluctance to revisit settled public land law. In its 1975 
decision in United States v. Maine,553 for example, the Court rejected a 
bid by eastern coastal states to revisit the Court’s 1947 decision in 
United States v. California,554 which held that the U.S. held “paramount 
rights” over the offshore waters and their seabeds. In the nearly thirty 
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years since that decision, Justice White observed for a unanimous 
Court, “a great deal of public and private business has been transacted” 
in reliance upon it.555 That being so, the Court was “quite sure that it 
would be inappropriate to disturb our prior cases, major legislation, and 
many years of commercial activity by calling into question, at this date, 
the constitutional premises of prior decisions.”556 The plaintiff states, 
White continued, “have been on notice of the substantial body of 
authoritative law, both constitutional and statutory, which is squarely at 
odds with their claims,” and have not “been in the slightest misled.”557 
In a unanimous 1980 decision involving public lands, the Court 
noted that it “has traditionally recognized the special need for certainty 
and predictability where land titles are concerned.”558 And even when 
the Court in 1988 simply clarified that Pollard v. Hagan’s presumption 
of state ownership applied to the beds of waters that were tidally 
influenced at statehood, even if not navigable, Justices O’Connor, Scalia 
and Stevens protested, charging that this was an “undoing of settled 
history” dating back more than 150 years that disrupted “the settled 
expectations of landowners” in “every coastal State.”559 
In short, the nation’s founders wisely gave Congress, not states or 
unelected federal judges, the responsibility to direct the future of the 
nation’s public lands. It is practically certain the U.S. Supreme Court 
would agree if asked. 
Still, because the Constitution empowers Congress to turn public 
lands over to states or private interests if it so wishes, defenders of 
public lands should not be complacent. Public lands will remain in U.S. 
ownership only if that policy continues to command the support of the 
American people. Put a little differently, each new generation of 
Americans must decide for itself whether to support the U.S. retaining 
ownership of these lands. 
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